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Planning and Scheduling Training
For Working Project Teams at NASA
by F. G. Patterson Jr.
In 1988 the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration began its Program/Project Manage-
ment Initiative (PPMI), a curriculum of Agencywide
training in systems engineering and systems engi-
neering management. Since its inception, many
courses have been offered. Sixteen courses are now
offered on a regular basis, shown in Figure 1.
Between 1988 and May 1996, PPMI conducted 294
courses and trained 6,368 people.
Each of the courses has been designed and prepared
for an Agencywide audience and addresses specific
issues that confront NASA management. One of the
most basic project management skills is planning
and scheduling. In even the most rudimentary per-
formance, a manager must prepare an ordered list of
tasks, allocate resources to each task, and prepare a
schedule that is realistic enough to convince higher
level management that proper controls are in place.
Because of its importance, planning and scheduling
is included as part of several PPMI courses. These
courses present a methodology for planning and
scheduling to a diverse NASA-wide audience of
both civil servants and contract personnel.
Problems with Traditional Methods of Project
Planning and Scheduling
Planning and scheduling is an activity that has much
in common with the definition of product require-
ments, and although the similarities may be recog-
nized, the activities are usually conducted much dif-
ferently. In the generation of product requirements,
the engineering community is increasingly alert to
the need of working with a group of stakeholders that
is thought to be representative of all active interests
in the development of the product. Representing
what he refers to as the viewpoint of the sociologist,
M. Jackson (1995) describes the definition of a sys-
tem as something that "has to be continually renego-
tiated subjectively between the various stakeholders,
who all have their own agendas and perspectives." In
most NASA projects, the efficiency of the require-
ments team approach is preferred to a canvassing
approach. Thus, a requirements team of stakeholders
is carefully picked, and a process of requirements
engineering is carried out (Patterson, 1997). The
result of the team approach is a specification that
reflects the needs of all the members of the team.
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Figure 1. A current offering of PPMI courses.
Most planning and scheduling activities, on the other
hand, are done by the project manager, who often has
the "help" of a support contractor, sometimes
referred to as a planner. The conscientious project
managers who compose their own plan and schedule
have the benefit of adjudicating every decision,
negotiating every tradeoff, and, indeed, of participat-
ing in every word and symbol in the documentation,
thus taking ownership of the documentation and its
contents. Now, while the dedication of such a project
manager is commendable, this process limits the
scope of the task to the best efforts of a single per-
son.
There is no one right person or group who, to the
exclusion of the others, can do an adequate job of
planning and scheduling. We have seen again and
again that the program or project manager cannot
know, or even analyze the quantity and level of
detailed data necessary to synthesize a comprehen-
sive plan. Task managers, while collectively repre-
senting a broader scope that a single individual, do
not speak for or understand the issues of other stake-
holders, such as the user community. Scientists are
primary customers at NASA, but they are focused on
the problem rather than the solution. Engineers have
the opposite bias and address the solution rather than
the problem.
When plans and schedules are written by a single
person or group, and in cases in which contractor
planning and scheduling personnel are used, the
community of stakeholders is sometimes asked to
"review and approve" the work. However, such
methods do not often get the investment, under-
standing, or adequate attention of stakeholders who
may be overwhelmed by--or, indeed, may not even
recognize their own inputs in--the technical and
symbolic language that is commonly in use. Thus, in
such cases, there can be little sense of ownership of
the plans by the stakeholder community.
likely to be underrepresented. The result is inevitably
reflected in faulty planning.
Purpose
Structure
Figure 2. Three dimensions of planning and
scheduling.
Problems with Traditional Methods of Project
Planning and Scheduling Training
Traditional methods of planning and scheduling
training use a "slide, lecture, demonstration, and
exercise" format that does not engage the student
adequately. In the best cases, fascinating case studies
may be presented, in which important classes of
problems are brilliantly analyzed and interpreted
with the participation of the student. However, with-
out the realism, and the attendant urgency offered by
a project in progress, such exercises are little more
than toys. In the worst case, students may be passive
viewers of a "spectator sport." There is little invest-
ment and no urgency about the critical path or other
results.
A more fundamental problem is that a systems engi-
neering approach (Sage, 1992) to planning and
scheduling requires attention to project variables in
three dimensions (Figure 2):
Moreover, the traditional "slide, lecture, demonstra-
tion, and exercise" format by its nature even in the
best case fails to emphasize the most important
aspects of planning:
1. Structure,
2. Function, and
3. Purpose.
While the best efforts of project management may
bring structure and process to a project, without
stakeholder involvement the purpose dimension is
Realistic negotiations among stakeholders is
unlikely. Planning, and replanning as a result
of scheduling or other resource studies, is a
process of "give and take" that loses
effectiveness when it is merely "role playing"
in a simulated negotiation in a traditional class
setting.
The critical role of project manager cannot be
realistically simulated, except perhaps by a
well prepared instructor who has thoughtfully
studied the script (thus denying the students
the opportunity to play the project manager
role). There is no real basis for the project
manager to decide among alternatives, since
there is no reality to use for a reference.
Training may be unduly focused on
automation, since, of all the elements of the
classroom exercise, the computer-driven
process is the most realistic and most
transferable to the participant's own project
domain.
Inadequate training for identifying tasks and
dependencies among tasks is arguably the most
elementary and important challenge of all.
NASA Project Planning and Scheduling (PPS)
Training
Based in planning theory, NASA PPS training
addresses fundamental needs that embody structure,
function, and purpose:
• The need to allocate and structure resources
(the structure dimension):
- division of labor, positions;
- structuring of time;
- phasing of cost.
• The need to implement and to support an
orderly process (the function dimension):
- performance of tasks;
- interrelationships among tasks;
- roles of people and groups.
• The need to define, develop, and deploy a
product that satisfies stakeholders in the
project (the purpose dimension):
- continual involvement of stakeholders;
- availability of appropriate management
controls;
- attention to quality.
NASA PPS training focuses on the structuring of
time and cost. As preliminary coursework (for which
the Project Manager is responsible before the course
meeting convenes), a work breakdown structure
(WBS) is developed that will permit the identifica-
tion of responsibility for the development of subsys-
tems, including civil servants, contractor personnel,
and their sub-contractors. Thus, the division of labor
and the identification of positions in the project have
been accomplished in advance, allowing the PPS
training to address the division of time and cost.
During a PPS course, a team of stakeholders is
assembled that includes the project manager and
staff, subsystem managers and other task managers,
customers (in NASA's case, these are often scien-
tists), and experts in other areas whose contribution
is essential to the success of the course. For example,
an expert on project documentation is usually
required. Depending upon the size of the project, the
team size may vary greatly.
The basic task for the PPS participants is to deter-
mine and write down the tasks that need to be done,
to create a partial ordering of the tasks that leads to
successful completion of the project, to identify
dependencies among tasks, to identify the person
responsible for each task, and to estimate the
resources required for each task. To accomplish the
work of planning and scheduling, the representation
of the tasks, their interrelationships, and their
resource requirements is an important factor. We
have two methods of representation that are current-
ly in use for PPS training, depending upon the size of
the project. For smaller projects, we use a Cards-on-
the-Wall format that creates a network of resource-
loaded tasks using cards to represent tasks and col-
ored string between cards to represent dependencies.
Each stakeholder sub-team has its own color for
cards. This "life size" representation and color cod-
ing of the network allows stakeholders to navigate
the walls, inspecting paths of special importance,
bringing events of the future into the present where
they may be purposefully influenced. For larger pro-
jects, we use the "one-pager" (Schoenfelder, 1995)
representation.
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Method for Smaller Projects
Our PPS course was developed by the Center for
Systems Management in Cupertino, California. The
course follows the following basic steps:
1. Identification of stakeholders.
2. Commitment to 4-day, 96-hour, off-site meeting
with a single goal.
3. Using a WBS, identifications and ordering of
project tasks by functional teams.
4. Identification of dependencies among project
tasks.
5. Cards-on-the-Wall technique for displaying
ordered tasks and dependencies.
6. Approval of network by project manager.
7. Capture of network into automated project
management system.
8. Computation and analysis of critical path.
9. Tradeoffs of resources and goals.
10. Repetition of process to create a successful plan
and schedule.
PPS training is different from a simple "facilitated
meeting" in which a facilitator captures ideas and
tries to assist in forming consensus among group
members. PPS training uses a format in which the
project manager presides over the process, but in
which the leader conducts the process. It has proven
to be essential to keep these roles distinct. That is,
the project manager must not conduct, and the PPS
process leader must not preside. The project manag-
er is responsible for the correctness of the planning,
for all assignments of responsibility, and for all other
decisions about the project. The leader, on the other
hand, is an expert on the PPS process and brings effi-
ciency, objectivity, and closure to the meeting, but
may know very little about the technical domain of
the project being planned. The choice of a leader
who can conduct and control the meeting is essential
to its success. At NASA this separation of roles has
been used very effectively.
Method for Larger Projects
To date, NASA PPMI has had only one experience
with a large group of more than 200 people. Our
approach used the "one pager" representation for-
mat, as previously mentioned. While the "cards on
the wall" process undoubtedly scales up for use in
larger groups, project managers may wish to use
other representation formats for capturing informa-
tion. For large projects, a recursive system of sys-
tems approach is used, in which parallel project plan-
ning and scheduling efforts are carried out for the
smaller systems.
Beneficial Side-effects of PPS Training
Based upon surveys, participation, and personal
observation, there is no doubt that each of the student
participants in a PPS training session leaves with a
new definition of planning and scheduling; a deep
appreciation of the basic tools, including GANTT
charts, PERT charts, logic networks, critical path
analysis, project resource estimation, and automated
tools; a personal success story that serves as a model
for future planning activities; and an appreciation of
the need for and the benefits of good planning. From
the viewpoint of the NASA Office of Training and
Development, these factors alone justify the use of
the intact team approach as a training vehicle.
Moreover, at least four predictable side-effects are
extremely beneficial to projects and have made PPS
training very popular among knowledgeable project
managers. They are:
. Team building. Without exception, every PPS
class has reported strongly effective team-build-
ing activity, recognition of the needs of other
stakeholders, and improved understanding of and
appreciation for product requirements.
. Identification of high-risk project plan ele-
ments. Teams are compelled to recognize
neglected or hard-to-face areas (often software),
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understand interactions among tasks, and per-
ceive relationships to critical paths. For example,
in one project in which software had been large-
ly ignored, the entire software documentation list
was defined, planned, and scheduled during the
training, an activity that resulted in identifying
software development as the critical path.
tigated for use in other program and project manage-
ment needs. In particular, there are two candidate
training programs whose team orientation suggests
the intact team approach. They are requirements def-
inition and software process self-assessment.
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Project Planning and Scheduling Workshops:
An Overview
by W. M. Lawbaugh
A highly acclaimed and well-received new training
effort on the part of NASA's Program/Project
Management Initiative (PPMI) has been taking
shape over the past couple of years.
So far, about a dozen Project Planning and
Scheduling (PPS) workshops have been completed.
Each has been designed to provide project teams
with an understanding of the principles of planning
and scheduling, along with an opportunity to apply
those principles to their own current project.
NASA staff and their contractors are brought togeth-
er for four or five days (and late nights) to work on a
project in the early planning or replanning stages.
Project teams execute the fundamentals of planning,
create and use a methodical work breakdown struc-
ture (WBS), and develop some kind of project logic
network. From there, they generate a project sched-
ule, and usually the definition and management of
the critical path. Throughout the workshop the pro-
ject team is expected to apply the principles of effec-
tive planning and scheduling in a hands-on effort for
their current project.
Project Planning and Scheduling workshops are con-
ducted on an as-needed basis at various sites for
intact project teams, including NASA staff, cus-
tomers and contractors. In order to develop a high-
level integrated network with a calculated critical
path, participants are asked to prepare for the plan-
ning process on two levels.
The first, essential level of preparation calls for a
team leader, usually the NASA project manager, to
work with a PPS facilitator and knowledgeable peo-
ple who are responsible for the project. Upon arrival
at the training site, the project team should have a
detailed description of project objectives and control,
along with a list of project milestones and deliver-
ables, both internal and external.
First-level preparation also calls for computer hard-
ware and software such as Microsoft Project to cap-
ture the project team's critical path at the end of the
PPS workshop. An expert operator, furnished by the
project team, is expected to handle up to 400 tasks,
process all the data generated by the team, meet the
online needs of the group, and then print out the pro-
ject network.
A second level of preparation is advised to assure
success of the workshop process. It is a good idea,
for example, to create a pictorial illustration of all the
essential components and interfaces of the project. A
flow chart should show how those components are
related to other systems. A hierarchical diagram
should show the decomposition and integration
structure, while an organizational diagram could
illustrate the reporting structure of the project team.
A list of constraints on the project would be helpful,
along with a description of any strategy for project
delivery.
To make sure the project managers, engineers and
technicians are all speaking the same language, both
a project glossary and list of acronyms are suggest-
ed. Often these lists are supplemented during the
Project Planning and Scheduling workshop as it pro-
gresses.
Space Station Support Equipment (SE) Planning,
Scheduling and Integration
One of the first PPMI Project Planning and
Scheduling workshops involved the Space Station
Support Equipment Integrated Product Team (IPT)
from the Kennedy Space Center. Larry Manfredi
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servedas project managerand leaderof the PPS
workshop.TheKSCsupportequipmentis developed
for the processingof International SpaceStation
flight hardwareresupplyand return missions.The
KSC supportequipmentIPT facesdaunting chal-
lengesin termsof planning,schedulingandintegra-
tion.Theteamwill design,procure,andconductver-
ificationof morethan75enditemsof supportequip-
ment.Their taskalsoincludesthecontinuouscoordi-
nationof interfacecontrol documents,design/docu-
mentreviews,schedulesanddeliverablespertaining
to more than49 end items of non-KSC-developed
supportequipmentto be turnedover to the IPT for
sustainingengineering.
Thepurposeof thePPSworkshopwasto ensurethat
membersof the Communication& Avionics Sub-
IPT, SimulatorsSub-IPT, Electrical & Instrumen-
tation Sub-IPT, the Test, Control and Monitor
System(TCMS)IPT,andLogisticsandMaintenance
IPT would integratetheir planningand scheduling
for the U.S. InternationalStandardPayloadRack
(ISPR) CheckoutUnit development.The ICU pro-
videsa sufficient fidelity test station,which will be
used to verify that the ISPRs and EXPRESS
(Expedite the Processingof Experimentsto Space
Station)racksareelectricallyandmechanicallycom-
patible with the space station module prior to
prelaunchinstallation.TheIntegratedProductTeam
approachis usedto ensurethat empoweredteams,
staffed and supportedby functional organizations,
areaccountablefor designsthat fully meetcustomer
requirementsandexpectations.Theteamisresponsi-
ble for requirementsdefinition, designdevelopment,
acquisition,fabrication,verification, training,opera-
tions support,maintenance,configurationaccount-
ing, and sustainingengineeringof standaloneend
itemsandsystemsthatmustbe integratedin orderto
completetheICU.
The team memberswere given instructionson the
SupportEquipmentIPT's techniqueof usingconcur-
Figure 1. Space Station Support Equipment checkout unit.
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rentengineeringand integratedprocess-basedman-
agementflows to facilitate planningand implemen-
tation.TheEndItem teamswerebriefedon thestruc-
ture of the developmentprocess,which facilitates
continuous improvement by incorporating all
required products, activities and associatedcon-
straints into an automatedproject management/
schedulingtool. Eachproduct being developedby
theteamwas identified at thetask level, alongwith
required duration, input/output requirements,and
interdependencies.Requiredskills were identified
andassignedat thetasklevel.Constraintswereiden-
tified to facilitateCritical PathMethodanalyses.The
planningandactualcycle time of eachactivity and
productdevelopmentwill betracedto facilitatevali-
dationof futureplanningandRoot-CauseAnalysis.
As the teambeganto link interdependenciesexter-
nally andinternally,it becameevidentthattherewas
a needfor a more structuredactivation/validation
planto verify all interfacesin theICU, includingser-
vices from the Communication & Tracking
Checkout System, Command & Data Handling,
Power, Fluids and TCMS. This structured plan
evolvedasan integratedtest scenarioknown asthe
PayloadIntegrationCheckoutFacility. The PICF is
designedto integrateexperimentsandcarrierssuch
asISPRsand performa final interfaceverification
testutilizing theTCMS andall othersupportingsub-
systems.
All in all, the multi-disciplined compositionof the
End Item teams,alongwith the many international
customersthat utilize the ICU to accomplishtheir
payload and experiment processing needs, says
MichaelJones,makesthe KSC SupportEquipment
IntegratedProduct Team's implementationtask a
unique challenge for effective project planning,
schedulingandintegration.
Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment lIl
(SAGE III)
SAGE III comes from a long lineage of successful
Langley Research Center SAGE-series programs.
Three of the four previous instruments operated
beyond their design-life and none has failed in-orbit.
The fourth, actually the first instrument in the series,
was operated for only four orbits during the Apollo-
Soyuz mission in 1975 to establish measurement
validity of the newly invented solar occultation con-
cept. Two of the four instruments were operated
beyond 14 years, with SAGE II still operating today
and returning good science measurements. Each suc-
cessive instrument added new spectral channels, but
older instruments were kept operating to preserve the
long-term data set. The SAGE series has the longest
term data set for aerosols and ozone in the middle
atmosphere, and is considered by the World
Meteorological Organization to be the standard for
global ozone and aerosol profile measurements.
SAGE III, like its predecessors, will be a principal
source of data for global changes in aerosols, ozone,
water vapor and clouds. State-of-the-art Charge
Coupled Device (CCD) detector technology has
been employed to boost sensitivity and spectral res-
olution. Increased sensitivity allows solar occultation
measurements to be taken deeper in the troposhere to
determine long-term global warming or episodic cli-
mate cooling after volcanic eruptions on Earth such
as the 1991 Mount Pinatubo disturbance, and addi-
tionally, allows for lunar occultation measurements.
Using lunar occultation, SAGE III measures night-
time species such as chlorine dioxide.
I I I
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Mission Verification Data
Ops Unit Processing
3.1 3.2
SW Dev. CM
I I
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Figure 2. SAGE III WBS.
SAGE III is currently planned for multiple launches
as part of the Earth Observing System. The first
instrument will fly on a Russian spacecraft--METE-
OR 3Mmin 1998. NASA Headquarters is currently
negotiating with space agencies of other countries to
find a home for the second instrument. An
International Space Station mission beginning in
2001 is planned for the third instrument.
International aspects of this program place special
challenges on the SAGE III Team. Each team mere-
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ber mustbe opennot only to different culturesand
new technicalconcepts,but to new ways of doing
businessthat arevery different from theAmerican
norm.Virtually everyaspectof theRussianinterface
(personal,technicalandprogrammatic)is vastlydif-
ferent from pastexperience.Thesechallengeshave
the greatesteffecton teamefficiency.Thus,project
work planningmust include hugeinefficiency fac-
tors to accountfor cultural differences,suchasthe
languagebarrier where all discussionswith the
Russiansmustgo throughinterpreters.
Figure 3. SAGE II1 measurements.
SAGE III was very fortunate in being able to sched-
ule a PPMI Project Planning and Scheduling
Workshop in Hagerstown, Maryland to coincide with
the first week of the hardware development (Phase
C/D) program. Twenty-seven team members repre-
senting Langley, Goddard, Wallops, and Head-
quarters civil service, on-site Langley contractors,
and the prime contractor, Ball Aerospace, met during
the second week of January 1995. Not just engineer-
ing team personnel, but everyone associated with the
Project was invited to attend. During the first
evening, sub-teams were organized to divide plan-
ning of overall team activities into smaller groups
categorized by instrument subsystems, interfaces,
operations, etc. Each sub-team planned its piece of
the program for two days, and then reconvened as a
team to integrate activities on the last two days. One
of the most popular of the team building exercises
was a meeting that lasted several hours early in the
week, in which each statement, and each require-
ment in the government contract with Ball
Aerospace was challenged. Each requirement and
each deliverable to the government, including docu-
ments, had to meet a strict test: if it didn't contribute
to measurement of ozone and aerosols in the atmos-
phere, it was thrown out. Needless to say, many
statements and requirements were eliminated.
CSM facilitator John Chiorini helped the team orga-
nize the work into a detailed work breakdown struc-
ture (WBS), and indicated the time-phased, interre-
lated activities using yarn and the Cards-on-the-Wall
approach. As each captain described the sub-team's
plan, critiques from members of the other sub-teams
served to brainstorm activities and interrelationships
until yarn stretched completely around the large
room and into smaller rooms at the back to describe
relationships among the approximately 400 activi-
ties. The first critical path to be calculated indicated
that delivery of the flight instrument was 14 months
after the 34-month requirement. Subsequently, the
team brainstormed more efficient logic to establish a
plan to deliver flight hardware on time.
It was not surprising that the newly formed team
began the week as an amorphous group of strangers
with only a vague understanding of what SAGE was
all about, but ended the week functioning as a high-
performance team with a good work plan. According
to Ed Mauldin, SAGE III Project Manager and
Hagerstown team leader, the most important benefit
from the week was quick development of new inter-
personal relationships among team counterparts and
establishment of a high-performance team very early
in the program. Being off-site in an informal envi-
ronment made it easy to forget who was government
and who was contractor, thus eliminating useless
communication barriers. A united team dedicated to
building the best possible scientific instrument with-
in budget and schedule constraints was formed and a
common sense of purpose was instilled. Now, about
halfway through the program, this team remains
within budget and on schedule, a remarkable success
story. This team is very proud of its record of estab-
lishing new standards for others to follow and high-
ly recommends this PPMI Project Planning and
Scheduling workshop process to other newly formed
project teams.
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Transport Research Flight Facilities
The third PPS workshop involved a diverse team of
engineers, designers, computer hardware and soft-
ware experts, QA, fabrication and resource analysts,
schedulers and project management people headed
by Allen C. Royal of Langley Research Center.
Their task was to plan and schedule the modification
of a B-757 aircraft from an airline configuration to a
research facility. In addition, the project team was
expected to develop an instrumentation integration
laboratory and create a simulator facility to replicate
the aircraft research flight deck.
"The team needed the time away from the everyday
working environment," said Royal, "to concentrate
exclusively on the job at hand, which was to develop
logic diagrams, work breakdown structures, GANTT
charts, resource assignments, etc."
He added: "In addition, the time spent 'locked up' in
a room 12 to 14 hours a day actually resulted in a
closer knit group of people (very important, consid-
ering the job at hand)."
The four-and-a-half day experience brought the
Langley team closer together with specialists from
Lockheed, PSI, Unisys and CSC, Computer Sciences
Corporation. "One of the many positive results of
this experience was that as the individual teams
worked," noted Royal, "people began to realize just
what was expected of them and what they were to
expect from another team, and the enormity of the
overall project--this was a big plus."
Another big plus was the momentum that was built
up during the PPS workshop that propelled the pro-
ject past its first major internal milestone. This pro-
ject team, too, asked for another PPS workshop but
the principal players could not be scheduled at the
same time.
Guidance, Navigation and Control Integration
and Test Facility
The next PPS workshop was designed for the guid-
ance, navigation, and control (GN&C) group devel-
oping a test facility for the International Space
Station (ISS) of Johnson Space Center. The ISS
GN&C function is distributed not only among differ-
ent segments of the ISS, but between U.S. and
Russian hardware and software. The GN&C
Integration and Test Facility (GITF) was proposed
by JSC Engineering as a facility where a majority of
these pieces could be integrated and tested during
development to increase the likelihood of the success
of the on-orbit configuration.
GITF is bringing together all of the U.S. GN&C
components to perform real-time closed loop testing.
Flight-equivalent processors for both the GN&C and
the Command & Control software will be integrated
with the Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver
processor, being fed inputs from the GPS radio fre-
quency signal generator, the engineering unit rate
gyro assembly, mounted on a three-axis rate table;
and an emulator, which is being developed and built
at JSC, of the Control Moment Gyro.
The Russian portion of the GN&C system will hope-
fully be represented by development units of the
flight processors, being provided to the Russians by
the European Space Agency, loaded with both devel-
opment and final versions of the Russian flight soft-
ware, and high fidelity models of the Russian sensors
and effectors.
Project manager and group leader Karen Frank of
JSC faces the challenges of relying on international
cooperation for significant deliverables to her pro-
ject, as well as the integration of institutionally
owned resources with program-contracted hardware.
Since the original workshop was conducted, numer-
ous deliveries to the project have slipped schedule
and the team has conducted its own mini-workshop,
based on the PPS experience, to re-network and
replan the project.
The next two Project Planning and Scheduling work-
shops occurred simultaneously but by different facil-
itators in September 1995. Blackhawk Management
Corporation led the High-Speed Research planning
and integration workshop in Hampton, Virginia, and
CSM, the Center for Systems Management of
Cupertino, California, facilitated the AGATE work-
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shop in Hagerstown,Maryland. The two different
approachesaredetailedhere.
presentedto theattendeesincludedthe "One-Pager"
trackingmethods,logic networksandteambuilding
approaches.
Figure 4. HSCT prototype.
High-Speed Research Program
For more than a quarter of a century, NASA has
sponsored research for a supersonic transport air-
craft. Environment concerns in the early 1970s led to
a halt in funding while the British-French Concorde
program moved forward.
A decade ago NASA received funding for Boeing
and McDonnell Douglas to conduct studies of a sec-
ond generation SST to carry about 300 passengers
and flying 6,000 rim.
Phase 2 of the NASA/industry effort to develop the
technology for the nation's first high-speed civil
transport (HSCT) shifted into high gear with the
High-Speed Research (HSR) planning and integra-
tion workshop held at the Chamberlain Hotel on Fort
Monroe in Hampton, Virginia, in September 1995.
More than 168 participants were present at the work-
shop, including officials and engineers from three
NASA Centers (Langley, Ames and Lewis) and
Boeing, Douglas, Lockheed and Northrop. The
workshop, supported by NASA Headquarters under
the Program/Project Management Initiative, used
NASA expertise and the Blackhawk Management
Corporation to teach the HSR Integrated Technology
Development teams the latest advances in project
management and planning skills. Rob Calloway of
Langley was the NASA group leader. Specific tools
In early 1995, Joe Shaw, Project Manager for the
Propulsion segment of HSR at LeRC, and
Dan Walker, Business Manager, sponsored a differ-
ent approach to the application of the One-Pager
concept to the HSR project. Rather than utilizing the
workshop format, Joe Shaw formed a small team
comprising, among others, James Wilcox of
Blackhawk Management Corporation and Lisa
Vietch of LeRC, to analyze the available data and
develop the One-Pager products. This was success-
fully accomplished, and early returns suggest that the
concept has proved to be very useful. (The One-
Pager illustrations in this article are from the
Propulsion segment of the HSR project at LeRC.)
At the PPS workshop, the high-speed research agen-
da for the next three years was set regarding HSCT
airframe development. The workshop involved the
efforts of 16 NASA/industry teams representing the
following areas of study: structures and materials,
aerodynamic performance, flight deck technology,
environmental impact and overall technology inte-
gration. Phase 1 of the HSCT development program,
involving technical solutions for environmental con-
cerns, were completed later that year. Phase 2 of the
program was fully implemented that year and
addresses the cost effectiveness and economic via-
bility of the aircraft systems.
The HSR program was spending approximately $20
million a month on HSCT research. NASA facilities,
including advanced computer simulators, wind tun-
nels and labs, were being utilized to develop an
HSCT technological database. As stated by Dr. Alan
Wilhite, Deputy Director of the High-Speed
Research Project Office at NASA Langley,
"Technology is being developed for industry use in
the year 2001."
The One-Pager approach involves a concise, inte-
grated, executive level set of cost, logic, schedule
and metrics data that encourages communication of
plans and of progress against plans. This approach
focuses on definitive end products with one or more
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of thesecharacteristics:highcost,highschedulerisk,
high technicalrisk and/or key integrationintersec-
tion. (Weedingout lessimportantitemsis extremely
difficult, saythefacilitators.)It startswith anunder-
standingof intermediatelevel logic flow: "If you
can't representyour areain one readablechart,you
havetoo muchdetail." The approachrelies not on
milestonedensity but rather on defining schedule
activitiesthatcanbecommunicated.
Implementationof the One-Pagerconceptcalls for
the impositionof certainintermediatelevel require-
mentson thetechnologymanagerin orderto satisfy
the requirementof consistency.While it requiresa
definedinterfacewith detailedcost, logic, schedule
andmetricplans,it doesnot imposespecificrequire-
mentson how a director managesbelow defined
interfaces,suchas a formal performancemeasure-
mentsystemor low-level logic. Automationis desir-
ablebut not mandatory--communicationis thekey,
andnoknownsoftwarecanyetmeettheconciseness
andintegrationrequirements.
Earned value computation with the One-Pageris
somewhatsubjective.Earnedvalueis estimatedat a
high level and does not depend upon milestone
counts.The plan is rebaselinedonly once a year
unlessotherwisedirected,andearnedvalueis com-
putedagainstthe baseline,not updatedfor changes.
Thus,thereareno "who's at fault" implications in
theOne-Pagerapproach.
The One-Pagerconceptis a proven methodology
which shouldbegiven seriousconsiderationfor use
in both very large hardwaredevelopmentprojects
and technologyprojects. It was developedby Phil
ShanahanandJamesWilcox in Texasandrefinedby
NASA.
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Figure 5. The One-Pager approach.
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The AGATE Project Cycle
The Advanced General Aviation Transport
Experiments (AGATE) project team in Hagerstown,
Maryland, took a different approach with CSM facil-
itators. A stakeholder team approach to project plan-
ning and scheduling involves a Cards-on-the-Wall
approach pioneered by Kevin Forsberg and Hal
Mooz in California.
The purpose of the CSM workshop is to create a
high-level integrated network with a calculated path.
The first effort is to develop a coherent Work
Breakdown Structure (WBS) upon the foundation of
a Project Products List. The PPL is a complete list of
hardware, software, support equipment, support ser-
vices, tools and documentation required to perform
the contract. The WBS is broken down into manage-
able work packages that can be scheduled, budgeted,
organized, statused and controlled.
Networking and scheduling are then introduced for a
Project Master Schedule reflecting any requirements
fixed by the customer. The Project Master Schedule
usually includes project completion dates and cus-
tomer-imposed reviews such as preliminary and crit-
ical design reviews, document delivery dates and the
like.
The Critical Path Analysis is at the heart of the
"Cards on the Wall" approach. A "Task Planning
Form" is filled out and tacked or taped on the wall.
Colored strings or yarn run from card to card show-
ing "input" and "output" (expressed in nouns), con-
nected to a "Task Description" expressed in verbs.
Thus, "data" might connect to a verb such as "draft"
with a noun output such as "report." The strings rep-
Major Milestones &
I.
/
FY 2001 Totals
4.728 60+824
20.0 154.1
4.0 78.3
;mall Aircraft Transportation Systems Analysis
Req "
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b) Publish Business Operating Handboolc
i
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3. GA Transportation System Requirements Defined '
a) Operational Requirements _ i
_- Systems Options
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Figure 6. AGATE's baloney chart.
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resent various tasks that feed into and flow out of
major milestones and deliverables along a timeline.
General Aviation manager Bruce J. Holmes of Langley
Research Center led the project team from Langley,
Lewis, Avrotec of Oregon, Kestral of Oklahoma,
Lockheed Martin, the National Institute for Aviation
Research and Raytheon of Kansas, the Research
Triangle Institute, Rockwell and Hamilton Standard.
After lectures on WBS development, networking and
scheduling, and critical path analysis, the project
team of 25 established assumptions and ground
rules. Holmes presented the AGATE program
roadmap showing the formation of a consortium
among NASA, the FAA and the small aircraft indus-
try. Following market analyses and general aviation
system requirements, the AGATE group hopes to
identify technology options, evaluate options, evalu-
ate candidate system components and publish a
library of documents for a revitalized small aircraft
transportation system in America by the year 2001.
The AGATE project will require government and
industry coordination in five work packages: flight
systems, propulsion sensors and controls, integrated
design and manufacturing, icing protection systems,
and a new one, the AGATE integration platforms.
Most of the facilities, such as simulators and labora-
tories/computers, are furnished by Langley. Lewis is
furnishing the icing tunnel, and industry/university
facilities are scheduled for flight tests.
SAGE III Science Plan
A year after the SAGE III project team met in
Hagerstown for Project Planning and Scheduling, the
project's science team met to coordinate the efforts
among four contractor groups and two NASA
Centers. Science Manager Lelia B. Vann of Langley
Research Center led the project team from Langley,
Goddard Space Flight Center (and Wallops Flight
Facility), CSC, GATS, SAIC and IDEA, Inc.
The SAGE III is scheduled for launch in August
1998 on a Russian Meteor 3M spacecraft as part of
NASA's Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) program.
The SAGE III science team included algorithm
development, software development for data
processing, simulations, validation and mission
operations. The team began with a detailed Work
Breakdown Structure and ended up with a critical
path. Some questions asked included: "What work
needs to be done? Who will do it? How long will it
take? What will it interface with?" Each task was
assigned an estimate of labor, material and other
resources. By focusing on critical path tasks, the
project team can identify those sequences that will
most likely determine the duration and drive the
schedule of the project.
The LaRC SAGE III Principal Investigator (P.I.) is
responsible for the science research activities, algo-
rithm development, data processing, validation and
mission operations. The MTPE program office is
responsible for overall coordination of the mission,
including funding, program integration and reporting
on investigation. They will support SAGE III's com-
munications, ground receiving station, and data gen-
eration and distribution.
To show the critical path for this multi-year project,
CSM facilitator John Chiorini generated a chart at
least 12-feet long showing the relationships of tasks
among different organizations. So, why plan? His
response: "To bring the future into the present so you
can do something about it."
There is every indication that the SAGE III teams, as
well as the other Project Planning and Scheduling
workshop teams, will not execute their efforts exact-
ly as conceived. Funding irregularities, management
structure changes, personnel shifts and unforeseen
events will inevitably alter their One-Pager and crit-
ical paths. That is to be expected.
What each of these project teams have, however, is a
sense of direction. Team members know up front
what the project will cost in terms of payroll, facili-
ties and equipment. Any subsequent trade-off in any
of the estimated resource areas will, they know, cost
the project in terms of budget, schedule or perfor-
mance. It may even derail the project if the trade-off
is excessive.
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Anotherthingeachof theseprojectteamsnowshares
is camaraderie,if not just a betterunderstandingof
eachotherandthe needsof eachcomponentin the
project. For some projects, the PPMI Project
Planning and Schedulingworkshop was the first
timeall themajorplayerscametogetherin oneroom
at the sametime. That intangible,in andof itself, is
invaluable,especiallyin anera whereteamworkis
the singlemostcitedcomponentof successin com-
pletedmissions.
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Figure 7. A planning print-out showing relationships of tasks.
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Project Planning at NASA
by John R. Chiorini
A number of NASA project teams have recently
experienced a change in the way in which they have
created their project plans. This has been brought
about by a fundamental shift in the understanding of
the purpose of the planning process.
The traditional view of planning is that the essential
end product of the process is a schedule of anticipat-
ed events together with a statement of the resources
necessary to perform all required work. Such a
schedule is best produced by identifying all neces-
sary tasks, their logical dependencies, the estimated
duration of each task, and the resources required or
to be made available for the performance of each
task. While such a view carries the implicit assump-
tion of interdependencies, durations and resources,
there is nothing in the end-product statement that
validates such an assumption.
Plans allow the simulation of a project. Too often,
however, the finished logic network and resulting
schedule are viewed as suitable for "what if' games,
and future event management is restricted to antici-
pating risks and managing tasks on the critical path.
Because the physical plan is the simulation, this view
assumes that such a plan, whether created by a plan-
Figure 1. Team Network Development.
ning department, by the project manager working in
isolation, or by a project team working as a whole, is
an equally useful product, as long as it is "correct."
That is, as long as it represents the future state of the
project, the process by which it was created is imma-
terial.
The fundamental shift in thinking came with the
understanding that the true purpose of the planning
process is the translation of requirements into agree-
ments to perform the necessary work. The agree-
ments are made by the members of the team tasked
with actual work performance. The schedule, with its
underlying logic network and task-level resource
plans, is an intermediate product. The agreements are
derived from the process of creating that network in
a team setting. It is this team process which holds the
key to effective planning because validity evolves
from the collective decisions made by the project
team in the process of creating the project plan. The
derived logic network and schedule, which are the
end products of this simulation, are more valid than
any created in isolation by a planner or project man-
ager hoping to anticipate the future decision of the
team.
To date, eight NASA teams have been facilitated in
the development of their project plans through a task
order contract between NASA Headquarters and the
Center for Systems Management (CSM). The teams
have included, among others, the Gravitational
Biology Facility Project, the Transport Research
Flight Facility Project, the Advanced General
Aviation Transportation Experiment--AGATE, and
both the SAGE Instrument Development and SAGE
Software Development Projects. The planning ses-
sions are intensive one-week team events which pro-
duce resource-loaded schedules. Facilities used for
the planning have included the NASA Wallops
Island Management Education Center and off-site
facilities provided either through CSM at their plan-
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ning center in Cupertino, California, or at other off-
site locations provided by NASA.
NASA employees who have attended Project
Management training courses conducted by CSM are
familiar with the planning process taught by them
and the use of facilitated Cards-on-the-Wall sessions
to capture the team decisions on the Work
Breakdown Structure and project plan prior to entry
into the planning software of choice (see Figure 1).
For those not familiar with the process, tasks are first
described on large cards (see Figure 2) by team
members. Each card contains space to document cer-
tain background information on a task, describe the
work to be involved in performing the task, identify
the input information required to start the task, list
output products of the task, describe the estimated
duration of the task, and the resources estimated to
be needed to accomplish the task work. Team mem-
bers construct a Work Breakdown Structure using
the cards and then link the cards on a large wall with
yarn, review the resulting task descriptions and logic
with the project manager and the entire team, and
only when concurrence is reached, the task cards and
logic are captured in project planning software.
Because the team gets to participate in the actual
planning process, agreements on task interactions,
resource commitments, risk mitigation actions, and
concessions on durations and hand-off logic are
made by the team during the planning process. The
initial simulation of the project occurs during the
planning, not as some post-plan creation of the logic.
That is, the planning process, conducted in a team
setting, allows decisions on future events, compro-
mises to be made now that will be implemented
some time in the future, workarounds to be planned
today to be used, if necessary, at some future event,
and agreements to be exercised in the future to hand
off products in specific formats to subsequent task
teams.
The strength of the process is best understood in the
observation from one participant who noted that only
WBS No:
Task Name:
Task ID: Estimated Duration: C#cle oneM_nules Hours Days Weeks Mon[hs
Task Manager:
Form Prepared By: Form Preparation Date:
Constraint, Start: Finish:
1 1
Out )ut
From:
2.
From:
3
From:
i
Resource Requirements:
To:
2.
To:
3
To:
Figure 2. The Task Planning Form.
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II
one or two people can stand around a 19-inch com-
puter monitor and critique planning logic, but the
whole team can stand around the 8-foot by 30-foot
wall of the planning room and participate in the cre-
ation of project logic.
The facilitation model used for planning by CSM
involves a multi-step process carried out over a four-
to five-day period.
The team gathers, typically the evening before the
actual planning begins. For the best planning, the
attendees should consist of representatives of all
stakeholders: NASA staff, contractors and their sub-
contractors if the latter groups have already been
chosen. Participants should be able to commit their
respective organizations in terms of resources to be
expended on tasks and risk mitigation actions. It is
essential that all involved stakeholder groups be rep-
resented during that opening session and throughout
the planning session so that critical decisions about
tasks, actions, resources, etc., can be made by the
group during the planning session and not deferred to
players not present during the actual planning. The
first session is an opportunity for introductions and
for the project manager to brief the group of the cur-
rent status of the project, get consensus on any deliv-
erables, and review the work breakdown structure
and other planning documents that currently exist.
The evening overview is essential to ensure a com-
mon frame of reference for all participants.
As a conclusion to the evening, the facilitator then
presents an overview of the planning process and
explains the work to be undertaken in the next few
days. One of the most important discussion points is
the definition of the agreed-to event that will consti-
tute the terminal event of the planning: launch,
delivery to KSC, etc. All participants must under-
stand the deliverables due at this event so that the
deliverables, can be defined in the actual planning
process. Also explained in this introductory session
are the ground rules by which configuration man-
agement will be maintained. The essential ingredient
in that process is the role of the project manager as
the final arbiter of the information to be entered into
the computer after posting on the walls of the plan-
ning center.
The planning work begins with the development of a
product-oriented WBS or the critique of the current
WBS if a suitable product-oriented WBS already
exists. The planning cards are used to describe the
lowest level of the WBS--task work, and any high-
er level integration/testing/procurement work. In this
way, those cards can be used directly in the creation
of the logic network.
Once a WBS has been created and approved by the
project manager, a milestone spine is created and
placed on the walls. This spine consists of the major
milestones for the project, as agreed to by all partic-
ipants. A milestone is a decision point where
progress on some portion of the project or with the
project as a whole can be reviewed and approved.
For each milestone, participants must agree on the
products to be reviewed, the name or office of the
reviewer with authority to approve or limit progres-
sion, and the nature of the proof to be demanded at
the milestone of the readiness to proceed with the
rest of the project. The milestone spine provides a
physical frame of reference for all participants, indi-
cating points on the planning wall where strings of
project logic need to come together. It constitutes a
top-level picture of the completed logic network.
Once the milestone spine is created, sub-teams are
designated to work on the portions of the logic
between network milestones.
Now the logic network can be created with the plan-
ning cards connected by yarn to create the physical
network. Each card contains a description of the
work to be done for a given task, the input(s) needed
to start the task, the output product(s), the resources
required to perform the work, and the amount of
resources needed and/or the duration that those
resources will be required.
Once the collective effort of the team has created the
network and the project manager has "walked the
walls" to review and approve all cards and logic, the
data is captured in whatever software the team will
be using to manage the project logic once they return
home. A critical path is calculated and the team as a
whole analyzes the results to determine if the derived
dates for milestones meet target dates imposed by
19
users,launchdates,etc.Theprocessof analyzingthe
network and shorteningthe critical pathbeginsby
identifying theearliestmilestonedatethat the team
judges to be unacceptable.Decisions are madeto
change logical relationships,reduce durationsby
adding resources,etc., until the deriveddate is as
closeaspossibleto theteam'stargetdate.The next
milestonein chronologicalturn is thenanalyzed,and
soonuntil datesareacceptedfor all milestones.This
processof networkanalysisproducesthe baselined
scheduleagainstwhich the teamagreesto work.
Throughout the planning process,five additional
activities of major importanceto the usefulnessof
thefinal productareoccurring.All acronymsusedin
theplanningprocessare listedasthestartof a com-
monprojectvocabulary.Any project risks identified
during theplanningare listed for later analysisand
developmentof mitigation plans.Any assumptions
madeduring the planningprocessare listed,asare
action items taken by specific team members.
Finally, teambuilding is anongoingactivity.
Participantsin this facilitated processhaveuniver-
sally praised it for its value in bringing the team
togetherandmaking clearto all teammembersthe
interdependenciesthatexist.To quoteafew:
"It broughtall of ustogether... It madeus
think aboutthe work involved, the chain of
action,theflow, the teamwork, thecommu-
nication."
"[It] forced me to think through all of the
functionsthat I will haveto perform."
"[I particularlyliked] thescheduleresolution
with all interestedpartiespresent."
"[It] gaveme a scopeof the programthat I
did not havebefore."
As notedabove,oneend-productof theplanningses-
sionisa resources-loadedprojectlogic networkwith
thecritical pathclearly identified.Sufficienttime is
alwaysallowedto balancethecritical pathsuchthat
theteamcanseetheactionsnecessaryto achievetar-
get milestones.Perhapsmore importantly, another
end-productis a clear understandingon thepart of
the entire teamof their mutual interdependencies.
Theprocessof creatingtheprojectlogic networkand
reconciling schedulingproblemsbuilds teamwork
andownershipfrom participantsto the sharedchal-
lengesof completingthe project accordingto the
scheduletheyhaveproducedasateam.
Successfulfacilitation will require that the teambe
preparedto dedicatefour to five daysto this process,
andall critical teammembersmustplanto bepresent
for thefull planningevent.Theproject'sdeliverables
andinternalproductsmustbewell-definedandater-
minaleventmustbedefinedordefinable.An existing
product-orientedWBS is desirable since, in the
absenceof oneagreedto in advanceby theteam,one
mustbecreatedduringtheplanningsession.Thepro-
ject teammustincludeonepersonknowledgeablein
theuseof theplanningsoftwareto beusedto capture
the logic network so that a teammembercan take
responsibilityfor exercisingthe softwarewhenthe
team returnsto its home facility. Teamsare also
responsiblefor providingtheir owncopyof thesoft-
waretobeused,asuitablecomputer,andahigh-speed
printeror plotter.If theteamdesiresto resource-load
thenetwork,anagreed-tolist of resourcesby nameor
laborcategorymustbeprovidedor definableduring
theplanningevent.Any limitationson theuseof spe-
cific resources(i.e., limited numbersof a specific
resources,limited availabilityof a specificresource,
etc.)mustalsobeknownat thetimeof planning.
If the teamproposesto usea facility other thanthe
CSM planning facility or one provided by NASA
Headquarters,the facility must include at least120
linearfeetof hard-surfacewalls on whichcardsand
yarn may either be taped or tacked.The planning
room must be dedicatedto the processso that the
logic networkcan remainup on the wall throughout
thefull planningsession.
Planningis mosteffectivewhenit is doneastheini-
tial eventonaproject.Planningmustalsobedoneat
the transitionfrom one projectphaseto anotheror
wheneverthecurrentstateof theprojectis suchthat
theexistingplanis nolongervalidbecauseof project
changesor discoverythat the original plan wasan
inadequatereflectionof theactualproject.
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The "One-Pager": Methodology & Application,
Experiences and Lessons Learned
by Tony E. Schoenfelder and James Wilcox
An article entitled, "'The One-Pager': Methodology •
& Application" appeared in the Spring 1995
(Volume 9) issue of this publication. The methodol-
ogy of the One-Pager technique was described in
some detail, as were applications in assessing a pro-
gram's baseline plan and determining progress
against the plan. This article will describe the appli-
cation of the One-Pager in assessing planning alter-
natives, and will also share some experiences and
lessons learned since early 1995. Although a careful
review of the previous article would greatly assist the
reader in deriving the maximum benefit from this
article, the following excerpts will serve to recapitu-
late the objectives of the One-Pager technique: •
NASA program and project managers need a
system that will facilitate timely, accurate top-
down program/project assessments required to
establish and/or assess the program's baseline
plan, determine progress against the plan and
assess planning alternatives.
Cost, schedule and performance measurement
systems must operate effectively and efficient-
ly under constantly changing conditions.
Existing NASA systems often fail to satisfy
these requirements.
Scheduling and performance measurement
systems are often very detailed and generate
vast amounts of data, but rarely in a form or
format that is conducive to providing timely
visibility into today's programs.
Contractual arrangements between NASA and
its contractors do not incentivize the contrac-
tors to provide good long-range schedule and
cost planning.
The One-Pager is a single chart that presents
an integrated cost, schedule and content (met-
rics) display for a selected end item. The
selection of candidates for One-Pagers is
based on the principle that management atten-
tion should be focused on major drivers, i.e.,
those definitive end-items that exhibit one or
more of the following characteristics: 1) high
cost, 2) high technical risk, 3) high schedule
risk, and 4) key integration intersection. There
is generally a high correlation between risk
(technical and schedule) and cost.
Who performs the work has no bearing upon
whether a system or subsystem is selected for
a One-Pager.
Deciding what not to include is perhaps the
most difficult process. Since the objective is
to focus management's attention on major dri-
vers, minor products and processes should be
reviewed on an exception basis only, and
should not be included in a One-Pager.
Assessing Planning Alternatives
NASA programs and projects currently operate in an
environment of increasing volatility and uncertainty.
One consequence of this situation is the frequent
need to engage in program/project replanning activi-
ties. Replans are often necessitated by budget reduc-
tions, content changes, unanticipated technical prob-
lems, schedule slips, cost overruns, or some unique
combination of these events. One-Pagers, by virtue
of their basic simplicity, facilitate timely, top-down
replanning by capturing the critical elements of the
project and providing a macro look at the program-
matic impact of various changes.
21
Project Milestones
Spacecraft lnteg & Test
System lnteg & Test
BB - Components
FYI
EM - Comp i
- Comp 2
Qual - Comp 1
- Comp 2
Flight - Comp 1
- Comp 2
BI_/EM Drawings Released
Qual/FIt Drawings Released
Test Completions
NS Specs Released
T._IQI P*r|e Npllvered
S/C A - Eng/Other Labor
S/C A - Mfg Labor
S/C A - Purchases
Total
2.3 :'_ 6 i4.4
il.5
F'Y4
V
: i
_ SS 1
: i i
42_ 10: :
: i !
7! _ 2
: i
_sa 7qt _sa
2.5! 2.21 2.011.71
5,0i 6.0::5.0i3.0
4.313.2i :
118i, i;oi47
SSI
SSI
FY5 FY6
:. _ _ I _ OD
: : ] i \/
y
:: pUAt, ,/tAC_
: i i
i
: i
i i
P=Procure
A--Assemble
T-Test
l=lategrate
i : :
: : i
4
3.0 i .O
1.8
4.8 1.0
! FLT
i.i
260
220
64
16
44.5
35.0
_6.___00
95.5
Figure I. A Simple One-Pager.
Figure 1 was used in the previous article and repre-
sents a simple One-Pager for a fictitious spacecraft
subsystem. We are currently at T-Now and have just
cornpleted the project Preliminary Design Review
(PDR). Let us suppose that we have just been noti-
fied of the following circumstances, and have but a
few hours to provide a credible response:
• Due to project-wide budget constraints, fund-
ing across the project will be reduced by
approximately 20-25% for FY2 and FY3.
The first step should be just a simple, overall assess-
ment of the nature and magnitude of the problem and
what it implies in terms of any proposed solution.
Note in Figure 1 the FY3 4th quarter cost plan for
$8.4M (approximately 12% of the $66M FY2/3
spending plan). Clearly, pushing a full three months
of costs into the future will not solve the 20-25%
reduction requirement, so we must consider other
options, such as changes in program logic or content,
schedule bar length squeezing and/or slack reduc-
tion.
• At the same time, external pressures (from
both Congress and our international partners)
have dictated that the flight date be given only
three months schedule relief.
Start first by identifying and considering those actions
that can be taken at the project level, where the dol-
lars involved are greater and more responsive to
schedule movement. Then consider actions at the sys-
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tern and subsystem levels. Our ground rules indicated
that we could give the flight date a maximum of three
months schedule relief, so our first action should be to
move the flight date three months to the right.
Our next action is also at the project level, but its
genesis can be traced back to the early stages of cre-
ating this One-Pager. Remember that one of the first
steps to be taken in building the baseline plan was to
review the schedules, understand how they were
developed and identify the underlying assumptions
with respect to bar length, shifting, lead time, etc.
This knowledge would aid in calibrating the overall
risk inherent in the schedule rationale, and would
identify areas where future actions might be taken.
When we reviewed the underlying assumptions of
this particular schedule, we learned that the space-
craft integration, assembly and check-out (IACO)
was to be performed on a single-shift basis. Notice in
the baseline schedule at the top of Figure 2 that the
IACO bar length is eight months long. By adding a
second shift and utilizing an accepted program
analysis rule of thumb that a second shift is approxi-
mately 70% as efficient as the first, IACO is reduced
to five months (8+1.7 = 5). This IACO compression,
in concert with the three-month slip to the flight date,
yields a six-month slip to the start of IACO (See
Figure 2, Rev. 1).
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The next steps should be taken at the system and sub-
system levels. All of the system and subsystem activ-
ity bars should be moved six months to the right,
retaining the same orientation to one another as in
the baseline. No attempt should be made at this time
to adjust bar lengths or take any other action which
might call into question the validity of the exercise.
Notice in Figure 2, Baseline, that although the pro-
curement activities for the various fidelities of both
Components 1 and 2 begin at the same time (proba-
bly for the convenience of the procurement process),
there is from three to six months' worth of slack
between the completion of testing of the various
fidelities of Component 2 and the beginning of
Subsystem 1 assembly and test. This presents us with
yet another opportunity to move scheduled activities.
By simply moving the activity bars for the various
fidelities of Component 2 to the right until all slack
is removed (See Figure 2, Revision 1), we eventual-
ly move additional costs out of the constrained years.
Finally, notice in Figure 2, Revision 1, that there is
an apparent gap of six months between the T-Now
line at PDR and the future scheduled activities. From
studying the completed schedule activities and met-
rics found on Figure 1, we observe the following:
• Subsystem 1 is well into its design phase.
• Roughly 70% of the breadboard/engineering
model (BB/EM) drawings have been complet-
ed.
• The project PDR has just been completed.
• Specification releases and purchase orders for
the engineering model part have been issued.
It would be too disruptive and inefficient to attempt
to terminate the project and then restart it six months
later. Our final action should be to stretch the engi-
neering model schedule over the six-month gap and
work at a lower spending rate (See Figure 2, Rev. 2).
This maintains momentum on the breadboard and
engineering model units, takes full advantage of
relief to both qualification and flight hardware deliv-
eries, and delays the buildup in both the engineering
and manufacturing workforces.
The final step is to adjust the costs and the metrics to
reflect the revised schedule. Figure 3 shows a One-
Pager for Subsystem 1 which reflects all the changes
made to accommodate the 20-25% budget reductions
in FY2 and FY3.
An experienced analyst can easily adjust the baseline
cost plan to both fit the new schedule restraints and
provide a smooth transition from T-Now into the
replan. An examination of Figure 3 will reveal the
following:
The total Estimate-at-Completion grows from
$90M to $95.5M, reflecting a penalty of
$5.5M due to schedule stretch and some
disruption;
The FY2 Engineering spending rate avoids the
immediate FY2 build-up, while the peak
activity moves into FY3. The brunt of the
penalty falls in the Engineering/Other
category;
The Manufacturing spending rate avoids a
build-up until FY3, and the peak activity
moves completely out of the FY2/3
timeframe;
The Purchasing replan maintains appropriate
relationships between spending and scheduled
procurement activities.
Figure 3 also shows the adjustments made to the
baseline metrics plan to fit the new schedule. An
experienced analyst can calculate a revised metrics
phasing which retains the baseline metrics/schedule
relationships. Note in Figure 3 that the revised met-
rics plan maintains continuity for engineering draw-
ings and parts deliveries, and previous relationships,
such as NS Spec Releases vs. the start of procure-
ment for Qual units, remain in place.
Utilizing the methodology just presented, an experi-
enced analyst could accomplish this replan in a cou-
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Figure 3. An adjusted One-Pager.
pie of hours, including consultation with a knowl-
edgeable technical person. The accuracy would be
entirely sufficient to support management-level deci-
sions.
lessons learned are the results of these and other
experiences.
Lesson 1
Experiences and Lessons Learned
Since Spring 1995, considerable effort has been
expended in incorporating the One-Pager critical ele-
ment analysis technique into several large applied
technology projects. In addition, the One-Pager tech-
nique-whereby a template embodying a discrete set
of selection criteria is used to identify activities to be
tracked for each critical element--was used to pro-
duce an integrated schedule summary for a large
spacecraft development project. The following
The One-Pager itself has evolved into a One-Pager
packet comprising four charts. These charts are, in
the order in which they should be developed:
Step 1. Summary Level Logic Network
Step 2. Logic Network Description
Step 3. All-Year Cost, Schedule & Metrics
Step 4. Near-Term Cost, Schedule & Metrics
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Step 1, developing the summary-level logic network,
has proven to be the most difficult yet most impor-
tant step toward successful implementation of the
One-Pager approach. When the precursor to the One-
Pager was developed, the originators of the tech-
nique were working in a large development project
where the overall logic was identified and well
understood. What they did not fully appreciate was
that at the inception of a project, logic is developed
from the top down, and is relatively simple and well
understood by many. However, over an amazingly
short period of time, as the major parts of a project
are dispersed to different contractors and subcontrac-
tors, the overall logic flow becomes more complex,
convoluted, and understood by only a few.
Developing the summary logic network as the first
step in implementing the One-Pager approach
enables all the project participants to see exactly how
the major pieces fit together and relate to one anoth-
Er.
Project logic should be established from project
inception through project completion, and should
clearly and concisely outline how the project will
converge on the final product. Figure 4 illustrates the
relationships of design cycles, test cycles and project
milestones for both a spacecraft development (Phase
C/D) project and a pre-Phase C/D applied technolo-
gy project. Note that both projects converge in the
same manner, and that the same techniques can be
applied to both. Note also that in both cases, the test
programs related to each design cycle are the most
concrete and easily communicated measure of the
project plan, and thus should be highlighted in devel-
oping the summary project logic.
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Figure 5 displays a very top-level view of the logic
network of an applied technology research project
for an improved combustor. With only a cursory
review, one can rapidly observe the following:
1. Two competing concepts will undergo the
following test cycles:
• Coupon testing
• Sector testing with and without new materials
• Annular rig testing without new materials
2. Following the test cycles and core combustor
design, a downselect will occur.
3. The selected concept will then undergo the
following test cycles:
• Annular rig testing, with new materials
• Core combustor testing
4. The final test cycles will validate that the
concept is ready for the development phase.
Figure 6 is a slightly expanded version of this logic
network at about the right level for One-Pager pur-
poses. Each logic box or node is identified by a
WBS-like number, the importance of which will
become readily apparent.
Step 2, developing the logic network description,
requires the identification of the key features of each
box, including the products entering and leaving, the
activities and/or tests performed there, and any other
useful information concerning that box. Notice in
Figure 7 that each logic description has a number
that corresponds to a logic box found in Figure 6. By
referencing the logic box number and consulting the
associated logic description, it is possible to immedi-
ately find out what is occurring there. Notice also
that special attention is devoted to describing the
number of candidates tested in each cycle, the nature
of the test programs, and the relationship of one logic
box to others.
In addition to providing increased visibility and
understanding, these summary logic networks have
been shown to be excellent aids to communication.
Discussions concerning some aspect of a project are
considerably enhanced by using the appropriate
logic network to provide much-needed context.
Steps 3 & 4, development of the All-Year and Near-
Year Cost, Schedule and Metrics charts, were cov-
ered in extensive detail in the Spring 1995 issue of
this publication. Therefore, no further discussion is
offered herein except for the following: The basic
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Figure 6. Logic Network expanded.
1.1 & 2.1 Subcomponent Evals
• Many coupons tested
• Feeds sector test program
• Continues during sector test prog
• Used for sector design refinement
1.2 & 2.2 Rectangular Sector Evals
• Combines components for integrated evals
• 4 configurations tested for each concept
• Primary feed to annular test program design
• Secondary feed to core combustor test program design
• Uses no new Mtls
1.3 & 2.3 Curved Sector Evais
• Added shape fidelity over rectangular evals
• Two test series of single configuration for each concept
• Feeds core combustor test program design
1.4 & 2.4 Sector Rig Tests
• Actual liner candidates from New Mtls program added to
test configuration
• Feeds downselect decision
Figure 7. Logic' Descriptions.
1.5 & 2.5 Annular Rig Tests
• Full up combustor components combined
• 1 Configuration tested for each concept
° w/o new materials
° Feeds downselect decisions
1.6 & 2.6 Core Combustor Design
• 1 Configuration for each concept
° Includes engine modification, systems integ &
instrumentation design
• Feeds downselect decision
2.1 Annular Rig Tests
• Final liner from New Mils program added to test
configuration
• Feeds core combustor test program
2.2 Core Combustor Tests
• Fab selected combustor concept
• Modify engine
• Includes test prep, core engine assy & instrumentation, test,
and data analysis
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One-Pager template for the Cost, Schedule and
Metrics chart was originally limited to 20 lines of
data. This was a deliberate act with a twofold pur-
pose. First, in an effort to maintain the utility of the
chart such that problem areas tended to "jump off the
page," it was thought that more than 20 lines of data
would present too much clutter. Second, it forced the
person preparing the One-Pager to select wisely
from among a large body of competing data.
Experience has taught that up to thirty lines of data
can be incorporated into the One-Pager without
destroying its utility. Finally, we would like to
emphasize that a good job of preparation in Steps 1
& 2 will make Steps 3 & 4 relatively simple to
accomplish. An All-Year Cost, Schedule and Metrics
chart is provided for your information in Figure 8. A
Near-Year chart contains the same data, but covers
only 18 months.
Lesson 2
The logic network you build and the schedules you
select should focus on activities leading to a specific
convergence or milestone. Activities describe the
step-by-step process for arriving at a convergent
point, e.g., design, fabrication and test, or design,
code and test. By tracking activities, you can observe
progress, anticipate problems and take appropriate
early corrective action. If you limit your focus to
delivery milestones, you will know if a milestone has
been met only when the due date arrives. You will
not know how well the milestone has been met until
it is far too late. A review of one possible scenario of
the combustor example illustrates the point (See
Figure 9). In this scenario, the baseline plan called
for coupon, sector and annular rig tests to be per-
formed prior to downselecting a concept. The actual
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Figure 9. Baseline Plan vs. Actual Performance.
performance shows that the downselect milestone
was met; however, the overall quality of the mile-
stone was compromised because the annular rig tests
were deferred into the future. Assuming that the dol-
lars originally required to arrive at the compromised
milestone were spent, achieving the final configura-
tion milestone will likely require additional dollars
and a longer schedule.
Lesson 3
Representatives of various project elements, e.g.,
IPT's, system and subsystem managers, contractors,
etc., may on occasion insist that One-Pagers are of
no added value to them and, in fact, intrude upon
their autonomy. Accusations of micro-management
have, at times, been hurled. If you are attempting to
implement a One-Pager correctly, you are actually
defining the information you need and the formats
you will use at an intermediate level, not a lower
level. You will be using existing data, and you do not
care how the data is structured or managed below
that intermediate level. You must carefully think
through this entire issue before implementing a One-
Pager, and you must be prepared to deal with some
negative feedback. You need to be able to clearly
describe what you are trying to accomplish and why.
Samples of a completed product may often help to
deflect or defuse criticism and turn it into support.
Your success also depends upon the degree to which
project management is convinced that this is the right
way to go and lends its unqualified support.
Lesson 4
If you wait until a stable baseline is in place before
you begin using the One-Pager to assess project sta-
tus and performance, you may never start the
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process. Force yourself to start assessing project sta-
tus and performance, and do not allow yourself to
lose this discipline.
There is a need for both near-term and strategic per-
formance measurement, and the two measurements
have different objectives. Near-term performance
measurement is performed either monthly or quar-
terly, and seeks to determine progress against the
current baseline plan. Strategic performance mea-
surement should be performed annually, and
addresses macro performance over a period of at
least a year. Strategic performance measurement also
looks at the changes in both risk profiles and logic
relationships, and seeks to assess their impact on
overall program health.
The following example illustrates the dynamic
nature of most projects and highlights the different
objectives of near-term and strategic performance
measurements.
Figure l0 displays a baseline program established at
the beginning of FY96. There is an all-year baseline
and a more detailed baseline for fiscal year 1996.
During the first year, the FY96 baseline was
replanned in December and again in March (See
Figure 11). The actual cost and schedule status at the
end of FY96 is also represented. Using the most cur-
rent plan (3/96), the computations in Figure 11 sug-
gest that the project should receive a good grade
(B+), as the overall accomplishment ratio was .87.
This is a perfectly valid measurement and is consis-
tent with the manner in which formal performance
measurement systems are supposed to work.
However, a strategic performance measurement
taken annually would address the following ques-
tions:
• What was the earned value in a macro sense?
FY96 FY97 FY98
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Subscale Tests Intermediate
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Figure 10. Near-Term and Strategic Performance Measurement.
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The earned value computations for the end of FY96 should be based on the most current plan, i.e. the
3/96 plan, and would be computed as follows.
9/95 Baseline
12/95 Replan
3196 Replan
9/96 Actual Status
Spending Ratio = Actual _; Spent = $95 = 95
Planned $ $100
Sch Accomplishment Ratio = Months Accomplished 1._0= = 83Months Planned 12
Overall Accomplishment Ratio = Sch Acc Ratio 83,=
Spending Ratio 95
= .87
Figure 11. Earned Value Computations.
• What programmatic objectives have been
compromised by accommodating this year's
problems?
• Has risk been added to the out-year plan by
increasing parallelism and shortening time
spans?
• Is the out-year plan still valid and achievable,
or have cost and schedule been force fitted to
an unachievable plan?
Figure 12 illustrates the strategic measurement of
this project. Remember from Figure 11 that the base-
line was replanned twice, such that the completion of
the Subscale Tests now occurs 18 months from the
start of the project rather than the original !2 months.
A strategic look at schedule accomplishment at the
end of FY96 would indicate that the project has only
accomplished 10 months of what is now an
18-month plan, yielding a schedule accomplishment
ratio of .56. The resultant macro overall accomplish-
ment ratio of .60 is far removed from the B+ grade
computed earlier. It is very important to periodically
perform this kind of "conscience" check. Subtle
problems can cause a project's schedules to drift to
the right, yet the effects of this drift tend to remain
undetected by near-term performance measurements,
particularly in cases where the baseline is adjusted
frequently. By forcing yourself to go through the
analysis, you and the rest of the project will be in a
position to address the schedule drift factor in a time-
ly manner. Many projects have drifted into severe
difficulty because they failed to take this kind of
macro view.
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Figure 12. Strategic Measurement.
Lesson 5
It would be wise to solicit help from someone who
has prior experience in the execution of the One-
Pager process, and it is mandatory that a knowledge-
able project office civil servant be dedicated to the
task of coordinating the One-Pager development
process.
Putting a One-Pager system in place is not easy. It
requires first that you understand and accept the phi-
losophy that sometimes "less is more." You must
also be able to identify and lay out logic flows,
define templates and select appropriate schedule
activities, and develop costs and metrics at the prop-
er levels. You must, above all, have a clear vision of
your ultimate destination, because you will be plow-
ing through mountains of data in search of the right
pieces. Someone who is experienced in this process
would prove invaluable, because the exercise is quite
different from anything most projects have done
before.
Particularly during the early phases of establishing a
One-Pager system, there is a great deal of coordina-
tion required. The right people must be made avail-
able at the right time, and encouraged to cooperate to
the fullest. There must be a dedicated civil servant
who has both the knowledge and the authority to
ensure that the proper degree of cooperation and
coordination occurs. Without this person, success
will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
Lesson 6
If your program/project is large, with many systems
and/or subsystems, you might want to consider an
additional step to help focus attention on the major
drivers, i.e., those definitive end-items that exhibit
one or.more of the following characteristics:
1. High cost
2. High technical risk
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Figure 13. Thermal Control System.
3. High schedule risk
4. Key integration intersection
In a large program such as the Space Station devel-
opment program, there may be as many as 1,000
major definitive end-items in the program. Using the
One-Pager technique, you may have reduced the
focus list to 150 end-items. A further narrowing of
focus may be achieved by using standard risk crite-
ria to rank each of the 150 end-items. Those items
which receive high scores are singled out for special
management attention in the normal course of pro-
viding program/project status and performance mea-
surement. Figure 13 shows an example of a One-
Pager-type schedule for a thermal control system.
The radiator activity bars are darkened to indicate
that they are critical path items. The heavy black line
indicates progress as of T-Now.
Figure 14 shows the Critical Path Survey form with
the six standard criteria. These criteria have been
used to assess the risk in the ATCS radiator's path.
Experience has shown that, with the assistance of
knowledgeable project personnel, a critical path sur-
vey can be done in relative short order with depend-
able results. The following is a brief discussion of
what one should consider for each criterion:
• Design Difficulty
- Has performance has been scaled up from a
lesser design?
- Are there complex or critical interfaces? If
so, are there many?
- Will this design have to satisfy a number of
different users?
- Is new technology required or involved in
the design?
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Item: ATCS - Radiators SubsystemiElement Manager: John Jones
Months tolstFItDellvery [ 15 ]
Months to Is/Fit Nee
Factor
I. Design Difficulty
2. Historical Problem Area
(T-Now = I IJgS)
D
Description
Significant increase in performance requirements of an
existing technology and/or complex interfaces
Degree of past cost, technical or schedule
3. Development Maturity
4. Status
5. Workarounds
Degree ofdeveloment program maturity vs flight delivery
Behind current schedule plan
Relief available from extra shies or alternate
6. Slack Time between need date and planned completion
High Moderate Low
Risk Risk Risk
3 2 I
Significant _ Little
Moderate Little
Modiste Significant
Significant _ Little
Moderate Significant
_ Moderate Significant
(Circlecolumn I,2 or 3 for e=chfactor)
Remarks
Deployment mech, fluid lines
Large cost growlh, schedule dritt
Dev, model redesign; Tight
Qual/FIt relationship
Qual assy 3 months behind schedule
Facility constraints
No planned slack
Figure 14. Critical Path Survey.
Average Scor_
• Historical Problem Area
- To what degree have cost, schedule
and/or technical problems occurred in
the past? Is there a history of cost
overruns, schedule drifts or requirements
changes?
-What is the performance capability of the
contractor? Is this the A-Team? Is there a
broad experience base?
• Development Maturity
- How much parallelism is there with respect
to engineering models, qual units, and flight
hardware?
- Is there a modified development template,
such as protoflighting?
- How does the build span (# of months)
compare with hardware of similar type and
complexity?
• Status - What is the actual schedule
performance to date vs the current plan?
- Risk ranking of 1 = low = 0 to 1 mos.
behind
- Risk ranking of 2 = rood = 2 to 3 mos.
behind
- Risk ranking of 3 = high = 4+ mos behind
• Workarounds - Are workarounds possible due
to the availability of some or all of the
following?
- Additional shifts
- Alternate logic
- Schedule compression
- Additional equipment or skills
• Slack - Does the planned completion date
support the planned need date?
- Risk ranking of 3 = high -- 0 to 2 mos slack
- Risk ranking of 2 = mod = 3 to 6 mos slack
- Risk ranking of 1 = low = 7+ mos slack
A note of caution is in order: After you have obtained
inputs from your various project sources, and before
you assign final values to the different risk criteria,
you must do a bit of reconciliation. For example, a
structures engineer may rank the risk associated with
the new design of a particular structure as high. Yet
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whencomparedto the high risk associatedwith the
designof anewpieceof complexavionicsrequiring
new technology,the structuresrisk would not beof
equal footing. You needto be the final arbiter to
ensurethatthefinal risk rankingsof thevariouscrit-
ical pathsarebalancedwith respecto oneanother.
Pleaserememberthat warningsignalsdo notalways
flow up to theproject managerearly enoughto per-
mit the most effective corrective action. In many
cases,thecontractoris incentivizedto viewthefuture
in adangerouslyoptimisticfashion.It is up to you to
establishthe protocols to flush out problems in a
timely manner.The small investmentrequiredof an
approachlike this will force improvedcommunica-
tionsandaid in settingtheright agendas.On smaller
projects,the project managermay do this kind of
rankingin hisor hermind,however,asthe sizeand
complexityof aprojectgrow,theability to compara-
tively analyze all componentsbecomesvirtually
impossiblewithoutacommunicationaidof this type.
The One-Pagercritical elementanalysistechnique
results in a packet comprising four charts for a
selectedenditem:
1. SummaryLevel Logic Network
2. Logic NetworkDescription
3. All-Year IntegratedCost,ScheduleandMetrics
display
4. Near-TermIntegratedCost,Scheduleand
Metricsdisplay
The techniquewas designedto help management
focusonkeycost,scheduleandtechnicaldriversand
serveas a commonbasisfor communications.The
productsaresimple in conceptand appearance,are
producedusing a consistentmethodology,focus at
the subsystemor key ORU level, are done in the
context of a hardware/integration/test"backbone,"
captureonly the important"nuggets,"andplacethe
emphasison "programmatics" (the interplay and
relationshipbetweenthe cost,scheduleandtechni-
cal aspectsof aprogram).TheOne-Pagerisnoteasy
to develop,but is relatively easy to maintain,and
oncein place,will prove to be a powerful tool that
will enableprojectmanagersto managemoreeffec-
tively.
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A Project Control Milestone Approach to
Schedule Control
by Walt Majerowicz
One of the principal benefits of logic network sched-
uling is that it provides a mechanism for the project
manager to focus on potential schedule problems in
order to apply the resources necessary to reduce, mit-
igate or avoid them. However, logic network dia-
grams can be cumbersome for the project manager to
personally manage from, especially on major pro-
jects which consist of hundreds of activities, mile-
stones and interrelationships. Likewise, the various
Gantt charts, tabular listings, histograms and other
products which today's automated project manage-
ment systems are capable of generating can be over-
whelming. And while a detailed schedule is impor-
tant, the control process can be augmented through
the technique of monitoring Project Control
Milestones (PCMs). PCMs enable the project man-
ager to understand the schedule "big picture" and
focus on urgent schedule issues with the confidence
that the PCMs are supported by the underlying detail
contained in an integrated project logic network.
The first step in using the PCM approach to schedule
control is identifying a suitable set of PCMs. A mile-
stone is an event which represents the start or com-
pletion of an activity and is based on a fixed point in
time. In general, milestones fall into three categories:
major, contract and detail. A major milestone is as its
name implies: a key event or one of extremely high
visibility such as a Critical Design Reviews (CDR)
or launch date. Contract milestones are those in
which a supplier is legally obligated to deliver a
product or service on a specified date. While major
milestones can also be contract milestones, other
examples of contract milestones are delivery of a
hardware component, completion of a first article
qualification test, delivery of a technical data pack-
age or completion of a facility's construction.
Finally, detail milestones represent the accomplish-
ment of work at lower levels of the project schedule.
Examples of detail milestones include release of
engineering drawings, placement of a purchase
orders for materials or sign-off of test procedures.
PCMs are key events within the project schedule
which are considered critical. As such, they can be
identified from any part of the logic network and can
include major, contract or detail milestones. In addi-
tion to the example milestones listed above, PCMs
might also include deliveries of flight hardware from
industry suppliers, release of major builds of ground
system software, successful completion of a proto-
type test, the release of a Request For Proposal
(RFP) to industry, etc. They can also represent the
completion of interim stages of work within a major
activity. The major criterion for PCMs is simple but
important: would missing the milestone threaten pro-
ject cost, schedule or technical health? If the answer
is yes, then it is a candidate for the PCM list.
PCM Illustrated
By way of illustration, Table 1 is the first page of the
Project Control Milestone & Total Float Report for
the hypothetical Meteoroid Identification & Space
Tracking (MIST) Project under development by the
TriStar Aerospace Corporation, which is the prime
contractor for this NASA mission. The PCMs were
identified from MIST's integrated project logic net-
work. For example, the first PCM in Table 1 is
MIST255 "Pre-Environmental Test Review" (PER).
MIST255 is the activity identifier within the MIST
schedule database which corresponds to the comple-
tion of the PER. Table 1 also contains the Baseline
Delivery and Baseline Total Float columns, which
refer to the delivery or completion dates and total
float of the PCMs that were planned when the project
schedule was baselined. Also included in Table 1 are
the current (April) and prior (March) months' fore-
cast delivery dates and total float. An actual PCM
completion is identified with the letter "A" next to
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'METEROID IDENTIFICATION & SPACE TRACKING (MIST) PROJECT
PROJECT CONTROL MILESTONE & TOTAL FLOAT REPORT DATA DATE: 30APR96
ACTIVITY ACTIVITY BASELINE BASELINE MARCH MARCH APRIL APRIL TF CHANGE
IDENTIFIER DESCRIPTION DELIVERY TOTAL FLOAT DELIVERY TOTAL FLOAT DELIVERY TOTAL FLOAT MAR / APR,
MIST MILESTONES
MIST255 Pre- Environmental Test Review (PER) 17M AY96 19 17MAY96 23 17MA Y96 23 0
OBS242 Pre-Shipment Review (PSR) 17MAR97 15 26MAR97 9 02APR97 3 -6
OBS240 Observatory Ready for Shipment 2TMAR97 I I 05APR97 3 12APR97 -5 -g
OBS024g Obsetvalory Amval at Launch Site 22APR97 I 1 01MAY97 1 08MAY97 -5 -6
OBSSO0 MIST Launch R_ r,e.s s Ol APR9g 0 01APRgS 0 06APR9B -5 -5
MIST250 MIST Mission Oper_ons Review ODOR) 28MAR96 $7 28MAR96 87 29MAR96(A) 0 0
POWER SLrBSYSTEM
POSA670 ÷Z Solar Array Pmle.!s Delivery 06MAR96 84 19APR96 52 I OMAYt)6 44 .8
POSA695 +Z Solar Array Panels Ready for SADDS I&T 20MAR96 $4 03MAY96 52 24MAY96 44 -8
_)SA671 -Z Solar Array Panels Deliver)' 03MAY96 49 31MAY96 26 31MAY96 33 7
F_'3SA696 -Z Solar Array Panels Ready for SADDS I&T t 7MAY96 49 14JI.JN96 26 14IUN96 33 7
POBAT960 Super NiCd Battery Delivery 15APR96 152 30APR96 142 30APR96(A) 0 0
POBAT9S0 Super NiCd Battery Dehvery (spare set) 13MAY96 152 29MAY96 142 29MAY96 144 2
C&DH SUBSYSTEM
CDH6012 RTT A Ready for OBS I&T 22MAR96 49 12APR96 5 23APR96(A) 0 0
CI)H6022 RT'r El Ready for OBS I&'l" 28MAY96 5 28MAY96 5 041UN96 g 3
Aq'ITrUDE CONI'ROL SUBSYSTEM
ACS402A ACS B5.2 Ready for Formal S/W IV&V 15MAR96 35 14MAR96 0 14MAR96(A) 0 0
DEPLOYABLES SIJBSYSTFA_
DES08021 +Z SADDS Hight Wing Ready for OBS I&T 04SEP96 12 12SEP96 2 03SEP96 14 12
DES08022 -Z SADDS Right Wing Re,_dy for OBS I&T 06SEP96 14 12SEP96 6 02OCT96 3 -9
DF_S2016 SADA Ready for OBS I&T 15MAR96 10 18MAR96 0 18MAR96(A) 0 0
Table I. Project Control Milestone and Total Float Report.
the date in the April delivery column. These ingredi-
ents comprise the fundamental elements of schedule
reporting: baseline schedule, actual performance,
current forecast and variance.
To describe this concept further, located under the
subheading Power Subsystem, is the seventh mile-
stone in Table l: POSA670 "+Z Solar Array Panels
Delivery." Again, POSA670 is the activity identifier
which corresponds to the delivery to TriStar of the
+Z Solar Array Panels from the Nova Corporation,
the industry supplier. Upon delivery to TriStar the
panels will be inspected and tested prior to turnover
to the next higher assembly. As indicated in Table l,
the baseline delivery for the +Z Solar Array Panels
was March 6, 1996 (early finish) with a total float of
+84 days. In other words, if the +Z panel delivery is
delayed beyond March 6, there are 84 days of float,
or slack, available before this delay would impact the
target completion date of the hypothetical MIST
Project which is its launch date of April 1, 1998.
Similar delivery and float status for the current
month of April and the prior month of March are
contained in the Project Control Milestone & Total
Float Report in order to highlight variances against
the baseline as well as the prior month's forecast.
Float will be described in more detail under the sec-
tion Control Milestone Analysis.
Lets examine why the POSA670 "+Z Solar Array
Flight Panels Delivery" has been identified as a PCM
in terms of the schedule, technical and cost health
criteria described earlier. First, in terms of schedule
health, a delay in the +Z Solar Array Panels could
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meana later than plannedcompletion of the + Z
SolarArray Flight Wing: the deployablesubsystem
of which the +Z Arrays are the critical component.
DelaysinFlightWing build-upandtestcouldfurther
delaytheMIST observatoryintegrationandtestpro-
gram.Ultimately, the launch readinesscould be in
jeopardy.
Next, the technicalhealth of the project could be
threatenedby a delayin this PCM.Forexample,fur-
therseriousscheduledelayswith the+Z SolarArray
Panelscould result in a decision to eliminate or
reducethe scopeof downstreamtesting in order to
meetthe launchdate.If thedelayof this or anyPCM
resultedin aslip in theplannedlaunchdate,it could
meanlosingvaluablesciencemissionlife andpossi-
bly lead to a significant cost overrun.In terms of
cost,TriStar hasa firm fixed price (FFP)contract
with the Nova Corporation for the Solar Array
Panels.With theexceptionof changeorders,delays
in delivery would not necessarilyimpact MIST's
costfor thesolararraypanelsthemselvesin termsof
theirdevelopmentbudget.While thisdirectcostmay
not be at risk in the caseof further delaysfor this
FFPdelivery,thereis almostcertainlytheadditional
indirectcostassociatedwith: 1) thetechnicalteam's
investigationinto the problem2) furtherprojectand
procurementmanagementattention, 3) additional
travelfundsto coordinatewith Nova,4) delayto the
start of the next higher assembly,and 5) possible
delay to the observatoryintegration and test pro-
gram.
Therefore,delivery of the +Z Solar Array Panels
from the Nova Corporationto TriStar is a critical
milestoneonthePCM list primarily for schedulerea-
sons,althoughcost and technicalelementsarealso
considerations.As a first step,identifying theproper
PCMsis an importantpart of providing the project
managerwith a conciseset of the milestonesthat
summarizetheentireprojectscheduleandprovidea
focalpoint for managementcontrol.
Establishing the Project Control Milestone Plan
Once the PCMs have been identified, their corre-
sponding planned completion dates (early finishes)
can be easily depicted as a cumulative plan over
time. MIST's cumulative PCM plan from its
February 1996 rebaseline through December 1996 is
summarized in Figure 1. Figure 1 was constructed
simply by adding together each month's PCMs and
plotting a cumulative curve. The cumulative curve is
a logical format for depicting the PCM plan because
its realism will be readily apparent in the conserva-
tive build-up, rapid acceleration and slow reduction
in PCMs typical of the standard "S" curve. The same
summary can be done for any period of time,
depending on the needs of the project. For a project
just getting underway, a summary of the PCMs lead-
ing up to the Critical Design Review (CDR) is a
good starting point. Additional PCMs could be added
in a "rolling wave" fashion as time elapses. The scale
could be by week, month or quarter. This approach is
similar to cumulative cost plans, drawing releases,
etc.
It is important to emphasize that since the PCMs are
drawn directly from the project logic network, the
PCM plan is traceable to all levels of the project
schedule: master, intermediate and detail. The PCM
plan is not separate from, but part of, the overall pro-
ject schedule. A PCM plan similar to Figure 1 con-
veniently summarizes what is expected to be accom-
plished over a fixed period of time.
With the PCM plan, the project manager now has a
summary metric or way of measuring the schedule in
terms of plan, performance and forecast-to-com-
plete. This high level view of the schedule allows
him or her to see the big picture, further enhancing
schedule control.
Control Milestone Performance & Forecast
On a hypothetical major project such as MIST, the
logic network is updated with the current status and
forecast once each month to coincide with workforce
and financial reporting. Since the PCMs are an inte-
gral part of the logic network, they are automatically
updated each month when the network is statused.
For example, in Table 1 the PCM ACS402A "ACS
Build 5.2 Ready For Formal S/W IV&V"was actual-
ly completed on March 14, 1996. This actual com-
pletion date is identified by the "A" in the April
delivery column. This means the build testing of atti-
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MIST 1996 PROJECT CONTROL MILESTONE PLAN
(PLAN = 2/25/96 RE-BASELINE)
60 ...............................................................
50 ..............................................................
40 ..........................................................................
30 ..............................................................
20 .........
0 ---t----------- ..... I I I ---_----- i I I i 4
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
'96 '96 '96 '96 '96 '96 '96 '96 '96 '96 '96 '96
t/2_ R_mHIne
ACTUAL
FORECAST (4_J0,'96)
Jan'96 Feb'96 Mar'96 Apr'96 May'96 Jun'96 Jul'96 Aug'96 Sep'96 Oct'96 Nov'96 Dec'96
o 3 6 13 20 30 37 45 47 50 52 54
Figure I. PCM plan.
STATUS AS OF: 4/30/96
tude control subsystem software Build 5.2 was actu-
ally accomplished on March 14 and delivered to the
IV&V laboratory for testing. The delivery of
ACS402A allows credit to be taken for completing
this PCM.
In addition to actual PCMs completed, the status
cycle also provides the current forecast, or projec-
tion, of when remaining PCMs will be completed.
Again, referring to Table 1, PCM CDH6022 "RTT B
Ready For Obs I&T" has a baseline scheduled deliv-
ery of May 28, 1996, which was also last month's
(March) forecast delivery. The current month's
(April) forecast completion is June 4, 1996. This
means that the Realtime Telemetry Tracker (RTT)
B-side flight unit will be finished testing and deliv-
ered for integration with the MIST observatory on
June 4, based on the forecast for completing the
work remaining on it.
Once the schedule status accounting cycle is com-
pleted and the actual and forecast dates for the PCMs
are obtained, PCM schedule performance is summa-
rized by plotting the actual milestones completed
and current forecast against the plan. Figure 2 illus-
trates the comparison of MIST's cumulative PCM
actuals and current forecast to the PCM phm which
was introduced in Figure 1.
Again, with a list of PCMs, the project manager can
see at a glance what his or her project's major events
are, when they are scheduled for completion and
how much margin or float exists to accommodate
possible delays. At the same time, the project man-
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MIST 1996 PROJECT CONTROL MILESTONE PERFORMANCE
(PLAN = 2/'25/96 RE-BASELINE)
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Figure 2. PCM performance metric.
ager has confidence in the realism underlying the
plan and status because the PCMs are contained
directly in the detailed project logic network.
Control Milestone Analysis
So far a basic approach to identifying PCMs and por-
traying their plan and corresponding performance
has been described. This process should be taken a
step further by analyzing what the performance data
means and making an assessment of what to expect
in the future for the project schedule. In the hypo-
thetical MIST example illustrated in Figure 2, some
important information can be obtained from the
PCM performance metric. For the period ending
April 30, 1996 (data or status date), 69% or 9 of the
13 planned PCMs were actually accomplished. The
project manager can quickly gauge the overall
schedule performance for the month as well as the
cumulative performance to date and immediately
focus on those major milestones that have not been
accomplished. Variances to the plan are readily
apparent, and specific PCM problems can now be
investigated for cause and corrective action.
Additionally, those PCMs that have not been com-
pleted in accordance with the baseline schedule indi-
cate not only the amount of work still remaining, but
suggest that performance efficiency may have to
improve in order to get back on track.
For example, milestone POSA670 "+Z Solar Array
Panels Delivery" was described earlier as one of the
four PCMs not accomplished as of the reporting peri-
od ending April 30th. In Table 1 the project manager
can see that its delivery has been delayed from the
forecast April 19th delivery at +52 days total float
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reported last month to the current forecast delivery of
May 10th at +44 days total float reported in the cur-
rent month, a reduction in float of eight days. In
addition to a comparison of the current month's fore-
cast delivery to last month's forecast, a comparison
against the original baseline delivery of March 6th at
+84 days float shows that the +Z Solar Array Panels
are almost three months behind the baseline sched-
uled delivery and forty days of float have been con-
sumed. Recall that total float is the amount of time
an activity or event can be delayed before it impacts
the project's completion point: the April 1, 1998,
launch date in the case of MIST.
While it is a concern that this PCM has been delayed
resulting in a loss of eight days of slack from the
prior month, it is not yet a major problem. In this
hypothetical example, a test equipment problem
(cause) has been resolved by the technical team and
a software patch (corrective action) has been incor-
porated by the Nova Corporation. Additionally, the
remaining +44 days of schedule slack is still a suffi-
cient margin should other unforeseen problems
emerge. The value of the PCM reporting is that it
alerts the project manager of significant schedule
changes to critical project elements in order to facil-
itate investigation and implement corrective actions.
For a project that has implemented a performance
measurement system (PMS), the PCM data provides
a way to augment the variance analysis and schedule
efficiency calculations. For example, the Budgeted
Cost of Work Performed (BCWP or earned value)
minus the Budget Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS
or the budget) indicates the Schedule Variance (SV),
or difference between the dollar value of the work
actually accomplished versus the work that should
have been accomplished in the reporting period: SV
= BCWP - BCWS. Similarly, the difference between
the PCMs accomplished vs. planned could be com-
pared to the formal SV. On a percentage basis the SV
and PCM variance should correlate within a +/- 10%
range. If not, then furthej" investigation into the dif-
ference may be require&
Similarly, the Schedule Performance Index (SPI) =
BCWP/BCWS. This ratio of work performed vs.
work scheduled can be easily compared to the ratio
of the number of PCMs accomplished vs. planned in
order to gauge the relative efficiency of the schedule
performance. The formal SPI and PCM ratio should
also correlate within a +/- 10% range. If the SPI indi-
cates 92% and the ratio of PCM actuals to plan is
only 75%, it might suggest that the project schedule
is not fully integrated with the PMS, earned value is
being taken for work performed out of sequence, etc.
While the PCMs provide a measure of schedule per-
formance, they also provide a good tool for trend
analysis and insight into the realism of schedule fore-
casts, particularly when applied to the surveillance of
contractor and supplier schedules. Consider Figure 3
which depicts the PCM plan, performance and fore-
cast for the hypothetical Advanced Spectrum
Analyzer (ASA). The ASA is a key scientific instru-
ment for MIST being developed by the Browning
Aircraft Company under a Cost Plus Award Fee
(CPAF) contract from NASA. NASA, in turn, will
provide the ASA as Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) to TriStar for integration into the
MIST spacecraft. Figure 3 summarizes the PCM sta-
tus for the ASA contract identified in Browning's
logic network as of February 24, 1996. The NASA
logic network is a Contract Data Requirement List
(CDRL) item delivered each month to the MIST
NASA Project Office.
Clearly, Figure 3 triggers a number of danger signals.
First, note that the Browning is 53% behind the
cumulative PCM plan through February 1996.
Moreover, an alarming trend has emerged in that
each month the actual number of milestones has fall-
en short of the plan. In fact, the Browning is averag-
ing only 4.2 PCM completions each month. Also,
another concern illustrated in Figure 3 is lhe classic
case of the overly optimistic forecast. Note how the
forecast, or estimate-to-complete, for the PCMs ulti-
mately "catches up" in August 1996, while the per-
formance trend suggests this is unlikely.
Although Figure 3 does not explain why Browning is
not performing to plan or what the basis is for its
optimistic schedule forecast, it does give the project
manager a starting point for investigating the poor
performance. Moreover, if caught early enough,
proper management and technical attention can be
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MIST ASA PROJECT CONTROL MILESTONE PERFORMANCE
(PLAN = 9/30/95 Nova Corp. Rebaseline/Estimate-To-Complete)
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applied to the underlying problems associated with
such contracts. Otherwise, if left unchecked or with-
out an improvement in efficiency, Browning's per-
formance could continue to deteriorate, supported
only by the claim that "things will get better next
month." In fact, as described earlier, the ASA con-
tract has been averaging 4.2 PCM completions per
month since October 1995. A simple extrapolation of
this rate suggests that the ASA will not complete all
62 of its PCMs until December 1996 if the present
trend continues. This is four months after the
planned delivery date of August 1996 (see Figure 3).
This could result in potential technical and schedule
problems for the MIST spacecraft integration pro-
gram which needs the ASA instrument to continue
into the test program. Moreover, severe cost over-
runs at the contractor could emerge if this condition
continues. As a CPAF contract, the MIST NASA
Project Office will have to allocate management
reserve to cover the Browning overrun in order to
complete the ASA instrument.
However, with careful surveillance of the supplier's
schedule performance through PCM monitoring, the
MIST Project would understand far in advance that
the ASA instrument would probably be delivered
much later than the Browning's estimate-to-com-
plete indicated. In anticipation of the late ASA deliv-
ery, a workaround plan could be formulated to miti-
gate this problem. For example, the observatory inte-
gration and test sequence could be modified, result-
ing in a workaround plan that integrates the ASA
before the start of the first observatory comprehen-
sive performance test.
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Whether for a total project or a key element of it--
such as a major hardware item under contract with a
supplier--a PCM approach to schedule control pro-
vides a framework for the project manager to under-
stand the schedule status against the original baseline
and the most recent replan. At the same time it
affords a simple, graphical way of not only capturing
trend data, but quantifying the amount of effort
remaining to be done and the urgent issues which
need attention.
A Project Control Milestone approach to monitoring
schedule performance, forecasts and margins does
not replace a conventional logic network schedule
or other scheduling techniques. PCM metrics are
simply a way to summarize a vast amount of sched-
ule information for the project manager so he or she
can understand the big picture and quickly assess
potential schedule threats in order to take the appro-
priate corrective action. With the enormous number
of technical, cost, procurement and administrative
matters that demand the typical project manager's
time, the PCM approach affords a way to quickly
focus on the urgent needs of the project schedule
and identify the elements that require immediate
attention.
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Systems Engineering: Three New Approaches
by Dr. Richard R Evans
This paper describes three new systems engineering
approaches: System Assessments, a Systems Inte-
gration (SI) program, and an Engineering Baseline
System (EBS).
Some of the key features reported for System
Assessments are an Assessment Control Board
(ACB), as a critical complement to the traditional
Configuration (or Change) Control Board (CCB),
with associated one-page Assessment Plans (APs),
and one-page Assessment Reports (ARs).
Primary characteristics of a Systems Integration (SI)
program include the continuous acquisition of non-
attribution System Reports (SRs); the structure of
Candidate Program Initiatives (CPIs) for intermedi-
ate system planning; the application of small (3-5)
consolidated customer/user/stakeholder and devel-
oper engineers in composite, non-attribution, altruis-
tic Problem Area (PA) teams for system engineering
review, and the use of Round Tables of participants
in extracurricular roles, like INCOSE referees, to
provide structured assessment support.
The EBS paradigm includes standardized (thus com-
mon) system element structuring and naming (by a
six-digit system number--that is a sequence number
to sustain audits--and that has a six-digit suffix to sup-
port the assignment of unique system numbers to that
span of separate system files. A system number has the
format <<xxxxxx.yyyyyy>>. The xxxxxx prefix is a
sequence number that is unique within the file or sys-
tem component where the system element is main-
tained; and the yyyyyy suffix identifies that file. When
a system element in a file changes, the next available
system number prefix within that file is assigned; the
suffix is fixed. All previous system numbers (prefixes)
associated with a given system element are retained.
System numbers are unique for each system element,
including specification elements, software code,
drawings, and hardware elements. System numbers
and associated tags, maintained in separate two-col-
umn ASCII-based index files, can be assigned by
system developers when they create new system ele-
ments, without using specialized tools, or they can be
assigned using database or CASE tool systems.
The Engineering Baseline System (EBS) addresses
the opportunities/problems introduced by the recent
widespread use of personal computers by engineers,
the attendant separate and typically uncontrolled and
non-standard structuring and naming of file-based
system elements, and the accompanying associa-
tions, as new adjuncts to what had been exclusively
a page-based environment. That uncontrolled and
non-common creation and use of multiple separate
file-based environments, and accompanying associa-
tions, brought on a loss of the standardized structure,
naming, and change management that was previous-
ly maintained by the page-based environment--with
its fixed and controlled page structure, page number,
and page date.
Added EBS features include the use of plain ASCII
two-column index files for all manner of associa-
tions-----even between code modules and user manu-
als-prepared, used and created by any and all engi-
neers, anywhere, any time, for any reason--in con-
trast to the use of a central specialty database system.
That EBS element addresses shortcomings in the
file-based approaches that are typically present in the
current CASE-type environments. These approach-
es, while overcoming some of the page-based issues,
but nevertheless based on the use of a few large, spe-
cialty tools, have also created problems and limita-
tions of their own--particularly in the limited scope
of those who are able to effectively participate.
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Systems Engineering Principles
Three new methodologies are presented as systems
engineering approaches in order to affect a shift
from simply engineering to methodologies for engi-
neering.
An example of one of the advantages of such a trans-
./ormation--like a Laplace or Fourier transformation
in addressing signal processing--is the following
passage by Tully (1989) and Thome (1993), that is
also illustrated in Figure 1, on the topic of systems
engineering:
Characteristic:
Predict systems behavior
Application of
Systems Approach
_Domain:
Systems problems Independent of
certain technologies
Figure I. Systems Engineering--
Three dimensions.
Systems Engineering consists of applying a systems
approach to the engineering of systems. Its domain is
the engineering of solutions to systems problems
independent of employing a certain technology for
realizing systems functions and properties. A charac-
teristic of systems engineering is that it has to predict
systems behavior and to design systems structure so
that emergent behavior can be provided for and con-
trolled within acceptable and desirable bounds.
In that approach, the authors address systems engi-
neering along three separate dimensions that are
more amenable to understanding and insight, as they
transform in a sense from only engineering per se.
That transform approach enables a separate consid-
eration of each of the three dimensions, rather than
addressing engineering as a whole. In the case of the
dimension of application of the systems approach,
for example, the transform effects a shift from the
topic of engineering, to a separate consideration of
the systems approach.
The authors, who also cite (Jenkins 1969 and
Churchman 1989), then apply the same transform
technique in considering the systems approach in the
context of the following three primary perspectives,
attributes of systems thinking, or ways of thinking
about the engineering of computer-based systems, as
depicted in Figure 2. The effective use of a three-
dimensional framework for describing systems engi-
neering and its various facets is similarly cited by
Sage (1992), Hall (1969), and Warfield (1972).
Highest level of
abstraction
Multiple
perspectives
_Whole is greater than the sum of
the parts Emergent properties
Figure 2. Systems Approach--Three dimensions
(Perspectives, Ways of System Thinking)
The three new systems engineering approaches
depicted in Figure 3, and presented in further detail
in Sections 1, 2 and 3, respectively, are elements in
this framework of systems engineering.
System Assessments and an ACB
Systems engineering approaches typicail2r include a
basic program control board known as the
Configuration (or Change) Control Board (CCB).
CCBs act after-the-fact in the sense that they receive
formal change proposals in specific formats, some of
which may have been in preparation for months. An
Assessment Control Board (ACB) serves as a com-
plementary and contrasting control board.
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System Assessments
Assessment Control
Board (ACB)
Systems Integration (SI)
Program
Engineering baselines (file-based
environment)
Figure 3. Three New Systems Engineering
Approaches.
There is a need for both assessment control (ACB)
and configuration control (CCB). Assessments make
discoveries, a CCB disciplines the application of
those discoveries. An ACB anticipates and plans, it
operates up-front--that increases its leverage; a
CCB operates after the fact and regulates. While
CCBs are essential for change and implementation
control, there is an equal need for the balance of
assessment. An ACB, in contrast and as a comple-
ment to a CCB, is focused on the plans for the initi-
ation of work, with a concentration on the plans for
its assessment. In that sense, an ACB is focused on
proposed plans and process, in contrast to a CCB
emphasis on details of proposed change and the con-
trol of its implementation.
As illustrated in Figure 4, an ACB complements a
CCB by exercising control of the initiation of work,
including trade studies that lead to proposed changes
for CCB consideration. The control of work initia-
tion by an ACB includes the plans for, and the results
of, the work assessment. An ACB focus is on assur-
ing the operation of ACBs at all levels of the engi-
neering effort, not just at the program office level.
An ACB's goal is to assure a whole set of ACBs so
that every engineer has the privilege to undertake
their labors in the context of an Assessment Plan
approved at an appropriate level by those to whom
they also have the opportunity to provide reports of
its application efficiently and effectively.
_ACB_O_p_e_ration.........
i UAR !
AP _ .... _-- --7
The Work t__: CCB Operation
' I I
' Propo e -- i Change
Figure 4. ACB and CCB Operations.
The initiation of work is controlled by an Initiation
Plan (IP) approved by the ACB. An attachment to the
IP is the one-page Assessment Plan (AP). Assess-
ment results are similarly reported in typically one-
page Assessment Reports (ARs). APs typically
address the following:
Scope: The work and the associated products to be
assessed.
Assessment Criteria: The criteria to be applied in
assessing the work and the products. This is one of
the hardest elements of a plan to devise, and accord-
ingly one of the most critical program controls.
Approach: How will the assessment itself be
assessed, how will the assessment be conducted--
the format and process: who will be on the sepa-
rate/independent assessment team--their names?
Schedule and cost: the assessment milestones and
the proposed investment in assessment.
System Integration (SI) Program
A parallel methodology that can be applied to
strengthen the CCB is for the ACB to also sponsor an
SI program, as a complement to final CCB program
control. The objective of an SI Program is to assure
that proposed changes are well prepared for CCB
consideration. Changes may be changes to the con-
figuration of the program architecture and schedule,
as well as a change to the design. There are three pri-
mary dimensions of an SI program as illustrated in
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Figure 5, Identification, Investigation, and
Implementation:
Identification _.,_
, Round ...... i investigatio n
'Tables'
T
Implementation
Figure 5. ACB Sponsored and CCB-Controlled SI
Program
The driving influence of the SI Program is in the first
two "I"s: Identification and Investigation--those
that are the most up-front. The Investigation process
also has, as a central feature, the use of Round Tables
(RTs), as a panel of three to five experts, to serve like
INCOSE referees as an unfunded assessment team
for planned investigations.
The SI Program structure includes four elements:
System Reports (SRs), Candidate Program Initiatives
(CPIs), Program Objectives (POs), and Problem
Area (PA) Teams. All are supported, as depicted in
Figure 6, by an SI Database,
System Reports (SRs) are individually numbered
records of every problem, suggestion, insight, or
idea. An SI Database is built on the ever-accumulat-
ing set of SRs maintained throughout the life of the
system. SRs are recorded as symptoms, so to speak,
without prejudice. They are not filtered by any crite-
ria, such as who said, or how they were reported, or
whether they were validated. They are accumulated
and honored by a unique SR Number that is never
reused. Thus, while the SR may be placed in an inac-
tive file, its identity, its number, always remains
unique to that SR.
Problem Area (PA) teams assess the overall pro-
gram handling of the SRs. The team members are
drawn from both the user and the developer. They
serve as professional collateral assignments, not as
System
s) Candidate Program
Initiatives (CPls)
_rogram
i SR- 002 _ _ _l Objectives (POs)
cPt-ool
, _ Problem Area Teams (PAs)-to assess _ _ i
-- -_ ..... T...... '...... !
L_S
Figure 6.
SI Database
Four-part SI Program.
representatives of their parent organization's man-
agement priorities or interests. The PA teams assess;
they do not have responsibility for solutions. They
recommend initiatives, but they do not sponsor
changes--with the attendant responsibility to imple-
ment approved changes. The PAs monitor the
process design and operation.
Candidate Program Initiatives (CPls) are tempo-
rary homes for potential program initiatives. CPIs
are unfunded and do not have a designated manage-
ment responsibility. They are the initial planning
framework, a neutral territory, for the allocation of
SRs. Note that SRs are allocated redundantly, with
one primary allocation and multiple secondary
assignments.
Program Objectives (POs) are funded, have
assigned implementation responsibility, and are the
formal vehicles for configuration change. POs are
assembled as the implementation packages from the
array of CPIs. They may be one entire CPI or include
portions of many.
Engineering Baseline System (EBS)
The EBS methodology provides a new paradigm for
system element identification, application, associa-
tion, and control in the engineering of computer-
based systems. Prior to the increasingly widespread
use of computers by all engineers, system elements
were only defined and controlled in a page-based
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environmentwherethepage structure, number, and
date established system elements. With computers
now available to, and in use by, essentially all engi-
neers, afile-based environment is being added to the
page-based foundation. The added file-based capa-
bility has both new promise as well as new risk; the
EBS methodology addresses both. The EBS para-
digm capitalizes on the file approach while address-
ing shortcomings in the typical CASE-type
approaches to afile-based capability. Those systems,
based on the use of a few large, central, specialty
tools have, while overcoming some of the page-
based-only issues, also created problems and limita-
tions of their own. EBS features include:
, File-based engineering baselines: prepared and
controlled day-by-day in a distributed manage-
ment framework.
. Standard common structure of all system ele-
ments: controlled and defined at the basic primi-
tive level as stand-alone, machine-processable
elements. These are file-based structures that are
structured from the page-based foundation.
, Centrally assigned blocks of standard-format six-
digit (auditable) system numbers that are main-
tained automatically in strict journal number
sequence for every system element--whether
requirements specifications, designs, test cases,
maintenance documents, code modules, hard-
ware components, budget elements, schedule
milestones, or user manuals.
. Engineering baseline (eb) numbers, and engi-
neering change (ec) numbers, with associations
to system numbers maintained in plain, two-col-
umn, ASCII index files for each primitive system
element.
. Plain ASCII two-column index files for all types
of associations that are prepared, used and creat-
ed by any and all engineers, anywhere, anytime,
and for any purpose. These contrast to the use of
a central specialty database system. EBS index
files, prepared as individual two-column ASCII
files, are thus not only amenable to being aggre-
gated into larger sets of other plain ASCII files,
they may also be aggregated into centralized,
specialty, database-oriented software packages.
Therefore, while not in any way constraining the
use of specialty database-oriented tracing
approaches, the index files actually enable them
by enabling wide preparation and use outside of,
and thus in support of, central database-oriented
systems. On the other hand, using only specialty
software applications, rather than ASCII index
files to create as well as maintain associations,
restricts visibility into those associations to either
hard copy tables, or by direct use of the special-
ty software that created the table. Individual
index files, however, remain visible to any and all
for use, modification, extension, and review, and
on any machine, and simultaneously also provide
the needed inputs for a central database reposito-
ry or report generator, as may be desired.
Problem AreaswCriteria for EBS Methodology
Evaluation: The problem areas in current practice
for the engineering of computer-based systems may
be summarized in the following top-ten set of inter-
related attributes. They are separate, but, as shown in
Figure 7, they aggregate along three dimensions of
system engineering needs (those that support,
enable, and sustain all three dimensions are listed at
the focus of the three axes):
• Associationsmpaired linkages of system ele-
ments.
Associations
7,9,10
3,5 
Baselines
1,2,4,6 8
Change
Figure 7. Three dimensions of systems engineering
need as addressed by an EBS.
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• Change management support, the identifica-
tion and recording of changes, the associated
rationale, and the specifics of new, changed
and deleted system elements.
• Engineering baselinesmmultiple controlled
baselines, maintained in distributed manage-
ment environments, by, for and of the engi-
neering.
I. Structure and granularity---common structure
and system element number
2. Autonomy--stand-alone system elements
3. Timeliness--controlled engineering baselines as
needed
4. Machine processability--ASCII files of systems
elements and paired association
. Distributed management--engineering groups
with control of their own baselines--yet all inte-
gratable
6. Auditability--system numbers as sequence num-
bers
7. Self-rule---creation of paired association index
files on the spot
8. Independence--non-dependence on hard copy
only change definition
. Aggregations--integration to one common data-
base of separately controlled files--enabled by
suffix block allocations
10. Associations--integration of all associations--
ASCII paired index files
II Structure and Granularity: The need is for
controlled standardization of structure and nam-
ing/numbering to the lowest level; individual,
uniquely numbered system elements that can
also be separately processed in machines; CASE
environments. Current ECBS controls are typi-
1
o
1
cally applied solely to formatted pages that are
not machine processable without uncontrolled
changes in structure. Current control practice
also uses a framework of sections, such as
3.2.4.2.6, that often span sets of many otherwise
separate requirements, specifications, and design
elements. Further, current practice generally
employs compound statements and bulleted and
tabular data that are thus neither lowest-level
system elements nor autonomous and stand-
alone, as discussed below.
Autonomy: The ECBS methodology need is for
stand-alone (as well as granular) system ele-
ments, that carry, with their unique name/num-
ber, all associated context and also the associat-
ed system/management information, including
changes, allocations, associations/integration,
and other system associations.
Timeliness: Effective engineering typically
needs controlledfile-based engineering baselines
day-by-day. Current ECBS practice generally
only provides formal page-based controlled
baselines, and at release intervals that often span
months, even years. Individual engineering
activities usually need day-by-day controlled
baselines for the interactions among their per-
sonnel, who are daily working on many tentative
what-if type alternative assessments, designs,
trade-offs, and other systems engineering consid-
erations. They need day-to-day engineering
baselines that are typically controlled among
themselves. While those baselines are not the
final contract type baselines that are eventually
formally established by a CCB, equally formal
control within their particular engineering activi-
ty is needed by them as they conduct their own
iterative assessments and planning: the engineer-
ing.
Machine processability: The need is for system
descriptions, whether specifications, designs,
hardware components, software modules, etc., in
ASCII non-formatted files--without dependence
on features that are not machine-processable in
ASCII files--such as tables, graphics, footnotes,
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endnotes, italics, bold and indents. Tabular data
is particularly susceptible to lack of machine
processability as well as the attendant loss of
automated auditability and change control. The
same or similar data are often included in a vari-
ety of tables, with differing scope, format, and
content. Thus change control, and even interface
control, are difficult, if not precluded altogether.
A controlled change to one table is not readily
carried over to the needed changes in other tables
as well as non-tabular system elements that
address similar data, but in different formats and
contexts.
Distributed control: Each engineering activi-
ty/organization needs to be enabled and responsi-
ble, to maintain a separate set of their own engi-
neering baselines, yet integratable into a system
whole. Current practice typically limits the
authorization to establish baselines to a few cen-
tralized personnel using a large and unique spe-
cialty CASE tool or database.
Auditability: Names/numbers are needed that
are centrally controlled, in a standard format (six
digits) and strictly sequential--so that any miss-
ing or redundant number is clearly visible.
Current ECBS practice relies on
numbering/naming of system elements only by
sections. They may include as many as 50 sepa-
rate stand-alone system elements, with variable
size numbers such as 3.4.2.1.3.7, and without
separate, individual system numbers, of a fixed
size number of characters such as 000357. In that
framework, the only available names, for each
system element is, for example, neither specific
to each separate system element, nor is it a
sequenced number to support audits. It is never
assured, for example, that 3.1.6 would immedi-
ately follow 3.1.5.3.7.2; thus numbers may be
missed. A sample of that inadequate page-based
approach, along with its other association defi-
ciencies, is presented in Table 1.
Self-rule: All engineers need to be both enabled
as well as responsible to establish and maintain
associations and dependencies--using the stan-
dard six-digit name/number--for all system ele-
ments they create and use. Current practice typi-
cally limits the establishment of associations to
those entered by a few centralized personnel
using a large and unique specialty CASE tool or
database.
Document. Function Associated
Segment
3.1.7.2 Provide on-line 3.2.2.5
help 3.2.6.2.2
Table 1. Sample Page-based (Non-EBS-based)
Traces.
e Independence from page-only change control:
Association of change data in each granular
stand-alone name/number is needed. Current
change management is typically based solely on
change pages, without change definition embed-
ded (by index files) with each separate stand-
alone system element. Current controls are typi-
cally applied solely to formatted documentation
that is not machine processable without uncon-
trolled changes in structure and associated
change history.
As possibly one of the most significant benefits of
the EBS paradigm for the engineering of computer-
based system, change information is explicitly estab-
lished and recorded for each system element, and
that is maintained in individual machine-processable
files and the associated two-column ASCII index
files.
In the present practice on several large-scale systems
currently in development, a major deficiency exists
in the processing of formally approved changes,
called RFCs, for Requests for Change. RFCs are
allocated in composite sets to new Versions of for-
mally controlled specifications, designs, budgets,
schedules, test plans, installation manuals, etc. Each
Version or Release, typically issued only after
months of review by a CCB, normally includes sev-
eral RFCs, with each RFC containing up to 10 pages,
and with as many as 20 separate changes (system
elements) per page. The RFCs are not structured to
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primitive systemelementsfor machineprocessing,
andthereis nouniqueidentifier (like asystemnum-
ber) for eachsuch basic changeelement.Further,
thereis noassociationindexfile (two-columnpaired
associationsbetweensystemnumbers)for the indi-
vidual changesin eachRFC and eachnew revised
systemelementin thecompositeVersion Release.
That deficiency is aggravated when the engineers
remove the new information from the pages and
enter them into machines. At that point, the non-
association is compounded by the loss of the page
date, number and structuring.
The following is an example of both the EBS
approach to automatically recording (in two-column
index files) changes to a given system element, and
typical optional display formats. All system element
information, including descriptions and index-file
associations, is maintained in individual two-column
index files. But various displays, such as the follow-
ing sample, may be generated with various data
aggregated on a page/report. In this case, para 3.2.1
was structured from the original in the page-based
environment into two system elements in the file-
based environment. Each was assigned a separate
system number: 000002 and 000003, respectively.
The second of those elements was altered by an engi-
neering change (ec) action designated as <ec0827>.
Please note that ec's may refer to formal RFCs or to
any other controlled change process--especially
those operated by the engineering staff as interim
what-if changes. In the process, the engineering
baseline (eb) increased from <eb0002> to <eb0003>.
In addition, that new element was assigned the addi-
tional system number of <<000643.900001>>.
Please note that the 2. <n2885> are for file ID (line
number) "2", in the file named <n2885>.
. <n2885> <eb0002> 3.2.1 The segment shall pro-
vide communications with the network through
the Front End (FE) <<000002.900001>>.
. <n2885> <eb0003> <ec0827> 3.2.1 The seg-
ment shall provide communications with the net-
work through the Back End (BE)
<<000003.900001 >> <<000643.900001 >>.
. Aggregations: Use of system numbers with a
six-digit suffix is needed to enable distributed
baseline generation and control--yet integration
(no conflicts in system numbers) into a single
program database--aggregation of all manage-
ment information into composite database sets of
any needed scope. Allocation of "blocks" of suf-
fixes (the "y") sustains this need: xxxxxx.yyyyyy
10. Associationsmintegrations: Each separate sys-
tem element needs to be associated with all other
related system elements by reference to its stan-
dard and unique six-digit system number/
name--in paired ASCII index files--that engi-
neers create without reference to any database.
Summary
System Assessment: An Assessment Control Board
(ACB), with a focus on Initiation Plans (IPs), their
associated one-page Assessment Plans (APs) and
Assessment Reports (ARs), can be essential comple-
ments to CCB operations. CCBs are essentially total-
ly after the fact. The resources (both time and
money) to prepare proposed changes for CCB con-
sideration have generally already been invested by
the time the CCB receives the results. The operation
of an ACB is management working up front, where
the leverage is greatest. The use of IPs, APs and ARs
at all organizational levels, operated in essence by
increasingly lower-level ACBs, is a key feature of
the ACB approach. The ACB influence of how work
is to be assessed is a prime lever on what is done.
The criteria for goodness and the names of those who
will prepare assessment reports are key areas for
management influence.
Systems Integration (SI) Program: Operation of an
engineering planning process, as an SI Program,
based on SRs as the primitives for all planning, is a
potential added aid that the ACB can sponsor as a
further complement to the CCB. An SI Program uses
bipartisan Problem Area (PA) teams that include
both customer and developer members. The PAs,
working on a low duty cycle, an hour a week or less,
concern themselves with the planning to address
their assigned SRs.
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Engineering Baseline System (EBS): Engineering
baselines represent a new and needed paradigm for
controlled visibility and traceability in systems engi-
neering. The EBS addresses the opportunities and
problems introduced by the recent advent of person-
al computers in use by all engineers and the attendant
separate and typically uncontrolled and non-standard
structuring and naming of file-based system ele-
ments and associated associations as new adjuncts to
what was previously exclusively maintained as a
page-based environment.
The EBS is more a methodological framework than
a toolset. The EBS software is but one implementa-
tion of the approach. It exists to make real the prin-
ciples; but the idea, the approach, and the concepts
are essential. Not only is most of the so-called EBS
conducted outside of any special software (engi-
neers creating their own two-column index files in
any type of tool--including paper and pencil), sys-
tem development firms may quite readily construct
their own software implementations of an EBS, once
they appreciate and determine to employ the princi-
ples.
Acknowledgments: While there have been many
who have assisted in the development of the
methodologies described here, this article is the
sole responsibility of the author, it does not reflect
the views or opinions of any organizational affilia-
tions.
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What If You Held A Best Practices Meeting 
And Nobody Came?
by William R. Flury
"Hey! I've got a great idea! The Quality folks are
always telling us that we should be on the lookout for
better ways to do things. Let's hold a series of Best
Practices workshops and see what ideas people bring
us. We can email everyone to invite them and ask
them to come prepared to talk about the Best
Practices in their shops."
That's how it all began. We were discussing how we
could get started with the business of process
improvement and Mickey came up with the idea of
holding a series of workshops where people could
come together and discuss their Best Practices. We
all thought it was a great idea. After we talked about
it some more, we tried to figure out how many peo-
ple might come and what we might have to do to pre-
pare for the workshops. We agreed that we should
test the idea by each of us calling some key people in
our respective Centers and getting their reactions.
Before we split we all agreed to make the calls and
report back at our next meeting.
In order to keep the phone calls closely related to our
topics of interest, we decided to focus them on the Key
Process Areas (KPAs) of the Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) Capability Maturity Model (CMM). We
thought that we should limit the discussion to the Level
2 KPAs: Requirements Management, Planning, Project
Tracking and Oversight, Subcontractor Management,
Configuration Management, and Quality Assurance.
Focusing on just a few practice areas should give us the
biggest payoff. If we could identify the best practices
in these areas we could endorse them as standards and
start to spread them around.
What a surprise we got. The reaction to our calls was
nothing like what we expected--but it did reveal a
lot about our practices.
Reaction #1
"Gee, that sounds like a really great idea.., but we
don't have any Best Practices." These respondents
said that they do all of the things that we talked about
(i.e., the KPA items) but they always do them differ-
ently. They said that:
• Every job is different.
• Every customer is different.
The staff comes from widely varied
backgrounds and they learned different
techniques in school, in other Centers, or that
worked well on other projects.
• We just use what we think is best for each
case.
• All of these get the work done, so it would be
hard to choose which is best.
Reaction #2
"How would you ever decide which practices are
best?" With all of the different types of tasks and all
of the different procedures, methods, techniques, and
tools in use, how would you ever begin to make
some comparisons and evaluate differences?
What kinds of stories did we hear?
• Some things we do are in the textbooks...
but we're not doing it exactly that way.
• If you asked five people how we do it, you'd
get at least six answers.
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• The methodskeepchanging.
Thestaff keepschangingandtheteamdoes
thingstheway theythink will bebestfor the
circumstances--andthat variesby team
experience.
• Wedon't reallykeeptrack from oneprojectto
thenextonwhatwe dodifferently.
Theremight besomecommonalityamong
projects,but wedon't keepany recordof the
techniquesweusefor any tasks.Werely on
thememoryof ourkey people.
Weconcludedthatthemostsignificantproblemhere
wasthe fact that noneof the practiceswaswritten
down. Therewasno recordof what practiceswere
beingappliedto thedifferenttasksand,asaresult,it
would not bepossibleto compareresultsof the use
of differentpracticesonsimilar tasks.
Reaction #3
"When you say Best Practices, who are they sup-
posed to be best for?" Every set of practices requires
a mix of resource inputs and provides a set of outputs.
Everyone involved with those practices is affected in
a certain way. Each person can determine a cost/ben-
efit ratio associated with each practice. "So, who do
we want to please with our Best Practices: (1) the
customer; (2) our staff; (3) the supported and sup-
porting systems with which our practices interface?
For whom must we be best? That's a tough question."
"Looking at it another way, it's hard to figure at what
we must be best." Is the key (1) cost, (2) schedule, or
(3) technical performance, or (4) some combination
of the above? If it is to be a combination, what are
the relative weights? Some people contend that it can
all be reduced to a question of cost. Slipped sched-
ules have an operational delay cost. Poor perfor-
mance has a cost in rework--and, of course, cost
overruns have a cost--but we don't have any good
way to tally these.
We concluded from this that we would have to define
our objectives better so that we could begin to do a
better job of evaluation.
Reaction #4
"If we were to come to your meeting and describe
how we do things--and others described how they
do things, wouldn't a Not Invented Here (NIH) atti-
tude prevail? How would we ever be able to con-
vince others that our way is better than their way?"
That's the reaction we're used to seeing. People
come to meetings and talk about great ways to do
various jobs and then they go back and continue
doing exactly what they had been doing all along.
Nobody ever comes forward with any convincing
data--just opinions--and they don't sell.
Here's a summary of the situation.
• There are no standard practices--in fact there
are not even any routine practices identified.
There does not seem to be any basis for
comparison among practices since we don't
record which practices are used for various
types of tasks and we don't record the
outcomes.
We don't seem to know how to determine
best. We haven't decided what needs to be
best and for whom.
And, finally, we live in an engineering
environment where we rely on facts to make
our engineering judgments but, on the
question of engineering practices, we have no
facts, just opinions.
At the Next Meeting...
So, at the next meeting we decided it wou]d be pre-
mature to try to hold the proposed workshops. We
had to devise some way to start attacking the prob-
lems that had been raised.
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We concludedthat we shouldfirst focusonjust one
or two of theKeyProcessAreasandtry to figureout
how weshouldstartto find our Best Practices. One
thing was very clear: we had to get people to docu-
ment their practices. We couldn't even begin to eval-
uate the practices until we could see them. So Step
#1 "Get the practices documented."
Next, we addressed the question of what you would
compare. In looking at Requirements Management
practices, for example, we could look at:
• How many requirements were being handled,
• How clearly each was defined,
• How many TBDs were in the list,
• The stability of the list over time (amount of
change),
• The verifiability of the requirements, and
ultimately,
• The validity of the requirements.
We pondered how much recordkeeping might be
required and concluded that it would not take much.
We would need to record:
• The count of requirements;
• The number of changes per week or
month.., and the reason:
- Lack of clarity,
- Misunderstood customer,
- Customer changed mind,
-Tests could not verify meeting of
requirement, and
- Other; and
• The number of perceived shortcomings in the
products after delivery (validity).
With those figures for any set of practices, we could
begin to compare their relative performance with
other sets of practices.
We looked also at planning. Maybe that would be
even easier. For planning, we would just have to
have good data on the planning estimates and the
actual results. However, when we looked at this, it
was just a bit more complicated. For one thing, we
figured that we would need to know the basis of the
planning estimates--how did we figure what effort
each of the tasks would require? We would have to
document that as a key element of the planning
practice description. If "expert opinion" were being
used, we would need to document the expertise. If
an engineering roll-up were being used, we would
need to document the work breakdown procedures
that supported it. If a model were being used, we
would have to know what model and the expertise
of the operator using it. If standard rates were being
used, we would need to know the source of the
rates.
Our Action Plan Emerges
After hearing all the reactions and thinking them
over, we decided to take some steps to start laying
the foundation for identifying and evaluating the
practices of our respective Centers. Here's what we
decided:
, We should encourage everyone to start writing
down or drawing a picture of the steps in the
current practices. This would be a necessary
first step that would provide the foundation for
all measurements and comparisons.
. We should ask people to line up all the
variations of each practice and see how they are
the same or different. (We think that they will
find much more commonality than they expect.)
We will encourage the staff to agree on the
common items and start to use them in the same
way on all projects. We will also start to work
with them to see how they can begin to evaluate
the relative value of the variations so that they
can decide which is best for their situation.
. We will start people thinking about the concept
of Best Practices supported by real data to
prove their worth in various circumstances.
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, We will start publicizing the idea that everyone
should adopt this approach as their first "best
practice." We will begin by doing a newsletter
article on the subject.
The above is a fictional account based on staff"
responses to mention of the possibility of homing
some Best Practices workshops. The problems and
the suggested solutions are real, the "meetings" are
a literary device to keep the reader involved.
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Software Reliability Assessment--
Myth and Reality
by Myron Hecht, Dr. Herbert Hecht and Dr. Dong Tang
The importance of software as a contributor (if not
the actual cause) of catastrophic events has been well
documented (Leveson, 95). Moreover, as software is
integrated into safety critical systems, the same
quantitative reliability requirements which have
been previously allocated to hardware are now being
allocated to both hardware and software. For exam-
ple, both U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations and
International Joint Aviation Regulations impose
maximum acceptable probabilities for failures of
systems in passenger transport aircraft. Part 10 of the
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations also establishes
maximum acceptable probabilities for radioactive
releases from nuclear power plants. When these stan-
dards were written, analog control systems were the
dominant technology, and there was an accepted
methodology for reliability prediction. Now digital
(i.e., software-based) systems are replacing analog
controls, but the old standards remain in force. The
need for updating the standards and methodology
extends to unregulated fields (e.g., computer-based
automobile electronics), where there is economic
motivation to being able to quantify the expected
failure behavior.
The greatest need is for methodologies that can
demonstrate that quantitative requirements are being
met. More detailed quantitative characterizations are
also needed to identify system bottlenecks and pro-
vide insight for decision making. An overview of the
principal methodologies is presented in Table 1, and
individual descriptions of each methodology follow.
Technique
Fault density
Reliability growth
Structured
dependability
Rare events
Life Cycle
Phase
All (1)
Test
Test & operation
Operation
Typical
Measure
Faults/KSLOC
Failures/
execution hour
Failures/
execution hour
for each
segment
Failures/
operating year
Advantages
Reference data
available
Some reference
data available,
objective
measurement
Models software
st ructu re,
objective meas.
Applicable to
very high
integrity systems
Limitations
Must assume
encounter rate
Requires
observation of
multiple failures
Few reference
data, requires
observations
No reference
data, requires
observations
Predictive
Power
Low
Medium
Medium/high
Potentially high
(1) Prior to the coding phase, a measure of deficiencies per estimated KSLOC can be employed.
Table 1. Comparison of Reliability Assessment Techniques.
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Fault Density Model
The fundamental assumption behind fault density-
based prediction models is that as the number of soft-
ware coding defects (faults) increases, reliability
decreases. The U.S. Air Force Rome Laboratory
sponsored research into developing predictions of
fault density (i.e., number of coding defects per thou-
sand lines of source code) which they could then
transform into reliability measures, such as failure
rates (Friedman, 92). The predictions of fault densi-
ty are based on the characteristics of the application,
development environment, extent of reuse and other
factors. This study and other sources contain data on
expected fault density which currently ranges from 1
to 5 faults per thousand source lines of code
(KSLOC). The translation of fault density to failure
rate requires assumptions about the probability of
encountering a fault during execution. This probabil-
ity can vary widely, depending on the location and
nature of the fault. The empirical data on this proba-
bility that are currently available do not support very
accurate predictions of the failure rate.
Software Reliability Growth Models
Software reliability growth models use measured
trends of failure rates (or change in intervals between
failures) and extrapolate them to future operation. In
most cases, they evaluate the reduction in failure fre-
quency during successive developmental test inter-
vals to estimate the software reliability at the conclu-
sion of the test (and sometimes into operational
deployment).
Reliability growth models have been an active area
of research since the early 1970s (Farr, 93).
Examples are the Schneidewind model, the general-
ized exponential model, the Musa/Okumoto
Logarithmic Poisson model, and the Littlewood/
Verrall model (ANSI, 92).
Figure 1 shows an example of such a model. The
software is executed over a certain time interval, rep-
resented as T, n, until a failure occurs. The time
between failures defines a hazard rate. It is expected
(but not required in this particular model) that over-
all, the hazard rate will decrease over time, but that
there are discontinuities as each failure occurs.
However, as the program runs for more time, there is
increasing confidence in the reliability of the pro-
gram. Applications of these models have all been
demonstrated using real data from software with typ-
ical failure rates of 10 -1 to 10 -3 per hour (Abdel-
Ghaly, 86, Musa, 87).
e
t, i .. I 1
t; t; t; t;
Time t
Figure 1. Reliability growth model.
Because of the very low failure rate required for life-
critical software, reliability growth models and tradi-
tional testing techniques are not suitable (Butler, 93).
For example, it would take 108 to 1010 hours (thou-
sands of years) of testing to demonstrate a failure
rate of 10-7 to 10 -9 per hour, assuming one copy of
software would be tested and one failure would be
observed (Butler, 93). Even if 10 copies of the soft-
ware are tested concurrently, it would still take hun-
dreds of years. The study also cited comments of
other experts in the field on this issue, including the
following:
Clearly, the reliability growth techniques are useless
in the face of such ultra-high requirements'. It is easy
to see that, even in the unlikely event that the system
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had achieved such a reliability, we could not assure
ourselves of that achievement in an acceptable time.
(Linlewood, 93)
Another limitation of reliability growth models is
their lack of ability to model software structure.
Reliability growth models treat the software as a
black box and form a single expression for its relia-
bility. Critical software systems include fault toler-
ance mechanisms, such as error detection and han-
dling, redundancy management and back-up tasks.
As such, the reliability of the whole software system
cannot be simply quantified by the number of fail-
ures observed at the component level. For example,
a transient task failure may be covered by the fault
tolerance provisions and may not affect critical func-
tions. This scenario has been verified by several
studies (Lee, 93; Tang, 95) which showed that
80 to 95 percent of software failures in real time
fault-tolerant systems are recoverable by redundant
processes. In such a case, reliability growth models
do not provide meaningful answers, and structured
dependability models must be used.
Structured Dependability Models
An alternative approach uses structured measure-
ments, similar to the established hardware practice.
In this technique, application software tasks, operat-
ing system kernels or executives, and hardware com-
ponents are regarded as equivalent elements in a sys-
tem. The operating times, failure rates, correlated
failure probability, recovery times and recovery
probabilities of any of these elements can be mea-
sured in reliability tests.
Reliability and availability are then estimated by
models of the system structure, using measurement-
based parameters for each component (Tang, 95).
Statistical estimation of reliability and availability
parameters and reliability modeling based on these
parameters has been a research topic in computer
engineering for 15 years (Iyer, 93). These analyses
are based on operational logs and failure data.
about ten years (Hsueh, 87; Tang, 92; Lee, 93). The
methodology has been extended to evaluate avail-
ability for air traffic control software systems in the
late testing phase (Tang, 95) and most recently to the
early operational phase at multiple sites.
In our experience, three model structures have been
found useful in measurement-based dependability
evaluation: the reliability block diagram, the k-out-
of-n model, and the Markov chain. Both reliability
diagrams and k-out-of-n models are combinatorial
models and typically assume failure independence
among modeled components. Markov chains are sto-
chastic models that can incorporate interactions
among components and failure dependence in the
model.
However, the current practice of measurement-based
evaluation for individual software systems (with the
number of installations <100) is still limited to fail-
ure rates of 10-2 to 10 -5 per hour and an availability
of three to five 9's (0.999 to 0.99999). For example,
the newly developed FAA Voice Switching and
Control System (VSCS) is being installed in 21
major U.S. air traffic control centers. The system
availability (dominated by software) was evaluated
to have five 9's as of March 31, 1996. If no major
failure occurs in the future, it would take 15 years of
normal operation of the 21 systems to demonstrate
an availability of the required seven 9's at the 80%
confidence level.
In the process of collecting and analyzing such data,
additional studies can be undertaken for more
detailed examinations of underlying causes. For
example, analyses of workload and failure data col-
lected from IBM mainframes (Butner, 80) and DEC
minicomputers (Castillo, 81) revealed that the aver-
age system failure rate is strongly correlated with the
average workload on the system. Recent studies of
data from DEC (Tang, 92) and Tandem (Lee, 93) sys-
tems showed that correlated failures across proces-
sors are significant in multicomputers, and their
impact on dependability is significant.
Dependability models have been used to evaluate
operational software based on failure data collected
from commercial computer operating systems for
The underlying assumption in these measurement-
based approaches is that the fundamental failure
mechanisms are triggered stochastically, i.e., are
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non-deterministic("Heisenbugs").However,thereis
aclassof failuresin whichthesoftwarerunsto com-
pletion but producesan unacceptableoutput. For
example,an electronic speedcontrol on a turbine
may in fact not shut down the device in an over-
speedcondition even though there was no crash,
hang,stopor delayfailure. Thisdeterministicfailure
conditionmaybe tracedto a logic fault in the code
or an incorrect set of parameters(e.g., the RPM
thresholdfor that particularturbine underthespeci-
fied setof pressuresandtemperatures).However,the
rootcauseof thefailuremayin fact lie muchdeeper,
i.e., defectsin the system requirementsor software
requirements.
Thetechniquesandmethodologiesfor estimatingthe
probabilities for these deterministic incorrect
responsefailuresarevery immature.It is temptingto
"wish themaway"by positingthatanadequateV&V
(verification and validation) or integration testing
programshoulduncover them.However, resources
are finite, and it is rarely feasibleto providesuffi-
cient time or moneyto perform the level of testing
neededto uncoverall suchfailures,evenin systems
designedfor high dependability.From a practical
perspective,whenestimatingsoftwarefailure rates,
oneshouldlook notonly atfailuresthat causelosses
or delaysof systemservices(e.g.,crash,hang,stop)
but also incorrect responsefailures. If there are
incorrectresponsesat the final stagesof testingor
integration,or in initial operation, then reliability
predictionsmadeexclusively on the basis of sto-
chasticfailuresmaynot bevalid.
Obtainingadequatedatafrom which to assessrelia-
bility andavailability is critical to anymeasurement-
basedmethodology.This obviousprinciple can be
difficult to implementin practicefor dependability
assessmentsbecauseof theconstraintsof anexpen-
sivetestingprogramor impendingprojectdeadlines.
Adequate data means monitoring and recording
eventsof interestsuchasfailuresandrecoveriesof
components,as well as performanceparametersof
the targetsystemwhile it is operatingunderrepre-
sentativeworkloads.It alsomeanscollectingdataon
failure modesso that an assessmentof the impor-
tanceof deterministic failures can be made.The
eventsandparametersto becollectedshouldberep-
resentativeof the systemoperationand meaningful
for the assessmentof the system.Measurements
shouldbemadecontinuouslyfor a sufficientperiod
to yield statisticallysignificantdata.Operatinglogs
shouldincludeinformationaboutthe location, time
andtypeof theerror, thesystemstateat thetime of
failure or abnormaloperation,and error recovery
(e.g.,retry) informationwhereapplicable.
Assessment by Rare Events Technique
As previously discussed, none of the techniques
described above can furnish a credible direct assess-
ment for failure rates lower than 10 -6 per hour. Under
favorable circumstances, the structured dependabili-
ty approach may support the conclusion that such
requirements are met by two or more independent
versions running under a highly reliable selection or
voting scheme, and this is indeed the way adopted by
many exacting applications. It is an expensive solu-
tion, because in addition to the multiple software
implementations it requires the development and
very extensive testing of selection mechanisms.
Further, multi-version software tends to degrade the
computational performance (because of the need to
wait for the slowest version to complete execution
and related issues), and the independence of the ver-
sions cannot be taken for granted (because they
implement a common set of requirements).
Therefore, there is ample motivation to investigate
other assessment techniques.
The basic premise of the rare events approach is that
well-tested software does not fail under routine input
conditions, which means that failures must be trig-
gered by unusual input data or computer states. This
assumption is validated by a number of investiga-
tions that are summarized elsewhere (Hecht, 94).
Late-phase testing will usually subject the program
to test cases that emphasize these rare conditions,
and this permits assessment of the failure probabili-
ty by the likelihood of encountering the rare condi-
tions that triggered the failure rather than by test
time.
As an example, consider a program that failed twice
during the last 1,000 hours of test. The first failure
occurred on restart after a simulated power interrup-
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tion, while at the sametime oneof the input signals
faulted to zero (sensorfault). The secondfailure
occurredwhenoneout of threeinputsfaultedto high
andanotheroneto low. Is thefailurerateof thispro-
gram2 X 10 -3 per hour as computed from the test
time?
Most observers would disagree with such an assess-
ment and will find it more reasonable to take into
account the occurrence rate of the triggering events
in the environment in which this program will oper-
ate. Assume that power interruptions normally occur
only once a year, and sensor failures to zero are
expected to occur only once every two years. The
combined probability of the joint event (assuming
the individual triggers to be independent), is there-
fore well over 10 -7 per hour. The second test case
that triggered a failure (one sensor high and one
low), has an even lower probability. After the soft-
ware has been modified so that it will not fail again
due to these triggers, its failure probability will be
much lower than that computed from the test time.
A quantitative assessment will consider the total
number of test cases that had been used and the prob-
ability of the natural occurrence of the simulated
conditions. To illustrate the basics of the quantitative
assessment, assume that during the 1,000 hours of
test there were 10,000 test cases that simulated con-
ditions that are expected to arise more frequently
than once per 10,000,000 hours and 1,000 test cases
simulating conditions that are expected to occur less
frequently. Since the only failures observed were due
to the second category, and since there was a ten-fold
greater opportunity for failures under the first cate-
gory, it can be reasoned that the failure rate in the
natural environment is expected to be not more than
10 -7 per hour. The mathematical formulation of this
approach is based on the probability of drawing
black and white balls from an urn (Hecht, 96).
Conclusions
ware product has attained a required reliability, par-
ticularly when the required reliability is high.
Structured dependability models can furnish esti-
mates that are more precise and that also identify the
elements where reliability improvement will provide
the greatest benefit. They are well suited for design-
ing and maintaining highly dependable computer
systems intended for flight control, ground trans-
portation, air traffic control and nuclear power plant
safety functions.
Except under unusually favorable circumstances,
none of these methods can currently assess whether
a software product meets requirements for failure
rates of less than 10 -6 per hour. The rare events
approach, described in the preceding section, has the
potential for being useful for applications that
demand the highest dependability, but it is the least
validated of the methodologies discussed here.
Because of the constantly increasing use of software-
based systems in critical applications, further
research into software reliability assessment is
urgently needed.
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Trends in Systems Engineering Life Cycles
by Dr. F. G. Patterson Jr.
The essence of life cycle management is division of
resources (6). Kingsley Davis recognizes division of
labor as one of the fundamental characteristics of
socialized man (9). The division of tasks into sub-
tasks, the documentation of progress through inter-
mediate products: these are important concepts that
did not begin in abstraction, but in concrete prob-
lems. The essence of engineering is problem solving;
and divide-and-conquer strategies, process definition
and improvement, process modeling, and life cycle
management are all engineering methods that begin
by reducing complex challenges into tractable parts
and conclude by integrating the results.
The failures of some systems engineering efforts
have led some theoreticians to criticize or abandon
the traditional ways of dividing resources. The trend
is broad and can be seen in many areas. Life cycles
are criticized for many reasons. For example, the
concept that a requirements phase is self-contained,
self-supportive, and separable from other phases has
come under sharp attack both from academia and
industry. The deeply ingrained tradition in industry
that requirements must not dictate any given specif-
ic design is also coming into question. The justifica-
tion for this belief may be readily derived from our
basic activity model, shown in Figure 1.
Synth_
Recognize
Analyze
Figure 1. Engineering activity model.
Each of the three orthogonal activities shown in
Figure 1 is necessary for successful systems engi-
neering. It is not clear, however, that separation in
time, separation by assignment to more than one
action team, or separation in terms of any other
resource based on the orthogonality of a process
model (that is to say, a life cycle) is effective in
reducing the engineering complexity problem. In
fact, the opposite seems to be true. In the natural
course of raising and resolving problems, it is much
more efficient to resolve problems when and where
they arise. The inefficiencies associated with follow-
ing each life cycle step to completion before begin-
ning the next step tend to result in a loss of informa-
tion, and this tendency is exacerbated in proportion
not only to the size of the engineering problem but
also to the size of the engineering resources (5). This
is a major obstacle in engineering big systems.
A solution based upon partitioning big systems into
a number of small systems reduces the inefficiency
inherent in life cycle-based approaches. However,
this solution does not answer the emerging genera-
tion of systems engineering theorists who maintain
that life cycle activities are dependent upon each
other in a non-trivial way that neither a waterfall
model, nor even a spiral model in its full generality,
can adequately address. This suggests that special-
ties, such as requirements engineering, are undesir-
able, unless their scope of activity spans the entire
life cycle: definition, development, and deployment.
An alternate way to view this suggestion is that the
number of specialties is effectively reduced to one:
systems engineering. The systems engineer is ever-
cognizant that a system must be specified, built, test-
ed and deployed in terms not only of its internal
characteristics, but also in terms of its environment.
Thus, the job of integrating becomes a global con-
cern that subsumes all of the steps in the life cycle.
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Process Improvement
The trend away from the use of prescribed standard
life cycles, while widespread in the private sector,
has only recently begun to affect government acqui- 2.
sitions. The U.S. Department of Defense no longer
requires the use of MIL-STD-499a for the acquisi-
tion of systems. Moreover, the new software devel-
opment standard, MIL-STD-498 (10), after years of
development, has been canceled without replace- 3.
ment. Other military standards are receiving similar
treatment. The idea is that developers have their own
processes that are specific to their own organiza-
tions. This change in emphasis should not be viewed
as freedom from the use of a disciplined approach, 4.
but rather freedom to customize the approach to opti-
mize quality attributes based upon variable factors in
the software development organization.
The wide acceptance of ISO 9000 as an internation-
al standard is actually a trend away from standard-
ized process models. The basic philosophy of
ISO 9000 has been summarized as: "Say what you
do; then do what you say" (14,23). ISO 9000 certifi-
cation (15) is a goal to which many companies aspire
in order to gain competitive advantage. Certification
demonstrates to potential customers the capability of
a vendor to control the processes that determine the
acceptability of the product or service being market-
ed.
The Software Engineering Institute has developed a
method of process assessment and improvement in
the software development arena, known as the
Capability Maturity Model (13,22,27). As the name
suggests, the model is based upon the existence of a
documented and dependable process that an organi-
zation can use with predictable results to develop
software products. In effect, the details of the process
are of little interest, as long as the process is repeat-
able.
The CMM model was adapted from the five-level
model of Crosby (8) to software development by
Humphrey. The five levels of the CMM model are:
1. The initial level: ad hoc methods may achieve
success through heroic efforts; little quality
management, no discernible process; nothing is
repeatable except, perhaps, the intensity of
heroic efforts; results are unpredictable;
The repeatable level: successes may be repeated
for similar applications. Thus, a repeatable
process is discovered which is measurable
against prior efforts;
The defined level: claims to have understood,
measured and specified a repeatable process
with predictable cost and schedule
characteristics;
The managed maturity level: comprehensive
process measurements enable interactive risk
management;
, The optimization level: continuous process
improvement for lasting quality. According to
Sage (25), "There is much double loop learning,
and this further supports this highest level of
process maturity. Risk management is highly
proactive, and there is interactive and reactive
controls and measurements."
The CMM helps software project management to
select appropriate strategies for process improve-
ment by examination and assessment of its level of
maturity, according to a set of criteria; diagnosis of
problems in the organization's process; and prescrip-
tion of approaches to cure the problem by continuous
improvement.
Even though managers may be seasoned veterans,
fully knowledgeable about the problems and pitfalls
in the engineering process, they may disagree with
each other on how to cope with problems as they
occur. If agreement is difficult to produce in an orga-
nization, the resultant lack of focus is taxing on orga-
nizational resources and may endanger the product.
Thus the management of an organization must be
greater than the sum of its managers by providing
strategies for management to follow and tools for
management to utilize. Such strategies and tools will
be the result of previous organizational successes
and incremental improvements over time, and mea-
sured by a level of maturity. The Capability Maturity
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Model (CMM), developed at the Software 1.
Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon
University,providesa frameworkthat is partitioned
by suchlevelsof maturity.Although the CMM was
developed to measure the maturity of software 2.
developmentprocesses,the ideasupon which it is
basedare quite general,applying well to systems
engineeringandto suchprocessesassoftwareacqui-
sitionmanagement,andeventhesoftwareengineer's 3.
own personalsoftwareprocess(12).
In ananalysisof theCMM, it is helpfulto look close-
ly at the five levels or stagesin quality maturity
attributableto Crosby (8) in order to seehow one
levelbuildsuponanother.They are:
. Uncertainty: confusion, lack of commitment.
"Management has no knowledge of quality at the
strategic process level and, at best, views opera-
tional level quality control inspections of fin-
ished products as the only way to achieve quali-
ty."
. Awakening: management wakes up and realizes
that quality is missing. "Statistical quality control
teams will conduct inspections whenever prob-
lems develop."
. Enlightenment: management decides to utilize a
formal quality improvement process. "The cost
of quality is first identified at this stage of devel-
opment which is the beginning of operational
level quality assurance."
. Wisdom: management has a systematized under-
standing of quality costs. "Quality related issues
are generally handled satisfactorily in what is
emerging as strategic and process oriented quali-
ty assurance and management."
5. Certainty: management knows why it has no
problems with quality.
In each of these environments, a particular kind of
person is required. There is a shift in focus from one
type of key individual to another as we move from
one CMM level to the next. The progression seems
to be, roughly, as follows:
Heroes. Necessary for success in a relatively
unstructured process, the hero is able to rise
above the chaos and complete a product.
Artists. Building on the brilliance of the heroes,
the artists begin to bring order, resulting through
repetition in a codifiable process.
Craftsmen. These are the people who follow the
process, learning from experience handed down
from previous successes.
. Master craftsmen. These are the people who are
experts in their respective facets of the develop-
ment process, who understand and appreciate
nuances of process and their relationship to qual-
ity.
. Research scientists. Finally, master craftsmen
appear, who, through experiential learning and
attention to process integration, are able to fine
tune the process, improving the overall process
by changing steps in the process while avoiding
harmful side effects.
The characteristics of the organizational culture are
directly related to organizational learning. The orga-
nization appears to depend primarily upon two fac-
tors: (1) the people who compose the organization,
and (2) the environment internal to the organization.
Of course, a case may be made for including the
external environment, since the overall success of
the organization (and its probability of survival) are
directly related to its adaptation to both the market
and technological factors. Some of the organization-
al characteristics may be organized in five stages,
following the CMM model, as follows:
. Heroes and supporters. Dependent upon the
ability of heroes to rise above the chaos, the orga-
nization grows up around the activities of each
hero, each of whom may require low-level sup-
port services. The hero's processes are largely
self-contained, and very loosely coupled with
other heroes' processes. While there are very
efficient aspects of this kind of organization
(viz., the hero's own activities), there is no over-
all efficiency induced by integration of activities
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intoanoverall process.Thus,at thisCMM level,
therearereally two levelsof workers:heroesand
others.
1 Artist colony. Through mutual respect and atten-
tion to the successful practices of the previous
generation of heroes, these people work together
to recreate the successes of the past, creating new
processes along the way. Management begins to
be able to track progress.
1 Professional cooperative organization.
Through long service and attention to process,
master craftsmen have emerged, creating more
hierarchical structure in the organization as less
experienced individuals are able to learn from
more experienced craftsmen. There now exists
the concept of "the way to do the job," a concept
that must be adhered to measurably.
Management's role is to control adherence to the
process by defining metrics and implementing a
metrics program.
. Society of professionals. At this point, the orga-
nization is mature enough to be able to receive
from its individual members meaningful sugges-
tions on how to improve selected parts of its
process and to implement them in the overall
process. This is largely a shift in the organiza-
tion's ability to learn, of becoming a "learning
organization."
e Institute of professionals. The organization is
now so mature that it is able to look continuous-
ly for ways to improve processes. Outside influ-
ences are no longer repelled, but are welcomed
and evaluated.
In parallel with the trend to decommission develop-
ment standards, there is a trend to buy off-the-shelf
products instead of customized or in-house devel-
oped systems. When products may be found in the
marketplace that meet the requirements of cus-
tomers, economy of scale in manufacturing may lead
to substantial cost savings over the cost of custom
development. Even when products are not available
in the market, the trend among large customers, such
as the U.S. Department of Defense and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, is to transfer
the risk of in-house development from the customer
to the contractor. Performance-based contracting is a
tool that allows a customer to issue product specifi-
cations and acceptance criteria, and a supplier to col-
lect a fee for creating the product as specified. Two
significant differences between performance-based
contracting and conventional contracting methods
are:
1. There is very little or no oversight of the con-
tractor by the customer.
2. All risks are borne by the contractor, who is paid
upon delivery of a successful product.
Concurrent Engineering
Concurrent (or simultaneous) engineering is a tech-
nique that addresses the management of total life
cycle time (7,24,26), focusing on the single most
critical resource in a very competitive market: time
to market (or time to deployment). This is accom-
plished primarily by shortening the life cycle
through the realization of three engineering sub-
goals:
o Introduction of customer evaluation and engi-
neering design feedback during product develop-
ment.
. A greatly increased rate of focused, detailed tech-
nical interchange among organizational ele-
ments.
. Development of the product and creation of an
appropriate production process in parallel rather
than in sequence.
Concurrent engineering is a meta-process in which
domain experts from all the departments concerned
with developing a product at any stage of the life
cycle work together as a Concurrent Engineering
(CE) team, integrating all development activities into
one organizational unit. The formation of the team
does not, per se, shorten the engineering life cycle;
however, through early involvement wilh the CE
team, organizational learning and analysis activities
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can be removed from the critical path to market.
There is an explicit tradeoff of manpower for time to
market. That is, the CE team involves more person-
nel for a greater fraction of the life cycle than in the
case of the waterfall model. Although the CE team
remains together for a greater percentage of the total
life cycle, the life cycle is significantly shorter than
in traditional models. Consuming a greater portion of
a smaller resource may not increase cost and, in
some cases, may actually decrease cost. However,
the time to market may be greatly reduced. In terms
of the abstract life cycle model, the activities labeled
"recognize," "analyze," and "synthesize" can occur
concurrently for all organizational elements involved
in the development of the product. Of course, there
will be some activities that have temporal, as well as
logical, sequential dependence upon other activities
(see Figure 2a and Figure 2b). Marketing, drawing
upon organizational expertise, including RDT&E
products, begins the process through the generation
of an idea of a product, based upon market analysis.
Marketing will generate targets for the selling price
and the production costs of the proposed product to
support management in deciding whether to proceed
with product development. During development, the
CE team work simultaneously with the design team,
to generate in parallel a design for the manufacturing
process.
A CE life cycle model is shown in Figure 3. The
principal feature of this process model is the concur-
rent development of the product, the manufacturing
process, and the manufacturing system through the
continuous participation of the CE team (28). A
notable feature of the life cycle is the absence of a
return path from production to design. This deliber-
ate omission is in recognition of the extremely high
risk of losing market share because of engineering
delays due to design errors.
The organizational response to a change to concur-
rent engineering from traditional methods is likely to
be fraught with difficulty. An organization that has
formed around a particular life cycle model, and that
has experienced a measure of success, perhaps over
a period of many years, will almost certainly resist
change. Effort in several specific areas appears to be
basic to any transition:
Definition
Development
Deployment
Figure 2a. Waterfall representation of abstract life cycle.
Definition
Development (
Deployment (
Recognize (Anaty__
Recognize (Analyz__
Figure 2b. The compressing effect of concurrent engineering upon the waterfall model.
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A concurrent engineering life cycle model.
We have noted that life cycle models are pur-
poseful, in that they reflect, organize and set
into motion the organizational mission. A
change of life cycle model should be accom-
panied by a clearly stated change of mission
that may be digested, assimilated and rearticu-
lated by all organizational elements -- indi-
viduals, formal and informal team structures,
and social groups.
Formal team structures should be examined,
destroyed and rebuilt, replaced or supplement-
ed as necessary to conform to the new life
cycle model. Informal team structures and
individual expectation, such as those
described by Stogdill, may be replicated and
thus preserved by the formal organizational
structure to minimize loss.
Particular attention should be paid to intra-
mural communication and cooperation among
individuals, teams, and departments in the
organization (7). Communication and cooper-
ation are essential elements of concurrency.
Acquisition or improved availability of com-
munications tools, developed through
7O
advancesin communicationstechnology,may
reducethecostandincreasetherateof con-
currency.
• Softwarereengineeringfor reuse.
Basedupontwo typesof reuseidentifiedby Barnes
andBollinger (2), it is usefulto distinguishbetween
two different types of software reengineeringfor
reuse:
. Software reengineering for maintenance (adap-
tive reusability) improves attributes of existing
software systems, sometimes referred to as lega-
cy systems, that have been correlated to improve-
ments that improve software maintainability (3).
. Software reengineering for reuse (compositional
reuse) salvages selected portions of legacy sys-
tems for rehabilitation to enable off-the-shelf
reuse in assembling new applications (1).
Both types of reengineering for reuse share a com-
mon life cycle (20), shown in Figure 4, for reengi-
neering to an object-oriented software architecture.
The life cycle is divided into three successive phas-
es: reengineering concept development, reengineer-
ing product development, and deployment. During
the concept development phase, reengineering is
considered as an alternative to new software devel-
opment. Considerations of scope and level of reengi-
neering allow planning and cost estimation prior to
the development phase.
Reengineering product development proceeds
according to the scope and level of reengineering
planned in the previous phase. Reverse engineering
of the old software is followed by forward engineer-
ing to create a new product. During the reverse engi-
neering stage, products are recreated at the design
and specification levels as needed to recapture
implementation decisions that may have been lost
over the lifetime of the legacy software. During the
entire reverse engineering stage, candidate objects
are repeatedly created, modified or deleted as neces-
sary to provide the basis of an object-oriented design
for the forward engineering stage.
During the forward engineering stage, the candidate
objects from the reverse engineering stage are used
to create an object-oriented specification and design.
Implementation through coding and unit testing
complete the development phase. During the deploy-
ment phase, software integration and testing, fol-
lowed by system integration and testing, allow pro-
duction and deployment to proceed.
Software reengineering is often associated with busi-
ness process reengineering. A recent study (21)
shows that there is a reciprocal relationship between
business process reengineering and software reengi-
neering. The enabling role of information technolo-
gy makes possible the expansion of the activities of
business processes. Moreover, changes in support
software may influence changes in the business
process. In particular, changes in support software
make the software more useful or less useful to a
given business process, so that the business process
Reengineering
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Reengineering Product Development
Reverse Engineering Forward Engineering
Deployment
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Figure 4. Software Reengineering Life Cycle.
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(or, indeed,thesoftware)mustadapt.Changesin the
potential for softwarefunctionality that aredue to
improvementsin thetechnologymayenablechanges
in businessprocesses,but must not drive them.In
general,successfultechnologyfollows, ratherthan
leads,humansandorganizations.
Similarly, changesin the businessprocesscreate
changesin the requirementsfor support software.
However,this cause-and-effectrelationshipbetween
businessprocessreengineeringandsoftwarereengi-
neering cannot be generalizedand is inherently
unpredictable.Eachcaserequiresindependentanaly-
sis.The effect of business process reengineering on
software may range from common perfective main-
tenance to reconstructive software reengineering.
New software may be required in the event that the
domain has changed substantially. Because the soft-
ware exists to automate business process functions,
the purpose of the support software may be identified
with the functions comprised by the process.
Therefore, reengineering the process at the function
level will in general always require reengineering the
software at the purpose level. This is equivalent to
changing the software requirements. Software
reengineering can be the result of business process
reengineering, or it can be the result of a need to
improve the cost-to-benefit characteristics of the
software. An important example of software reengi-
neering that may have little impact on the business
process is the case of reengineering function-orient-
ed software products into object-oriented products,
thereby choosing the more reactive paradigm to
reduce excessive cost due to poor maintainability.
Thcre are many levels of business process reengi-
neering and of software reengineering, ranging from
re-documentation to using business process reengi-
neering as a form of maintenance. In both there is a
continuum between routine maintenance (minor
engineering) and radical, revolutionary reengineer-
ing. At both ends of the spectrum, change should be
engineered in a proactive, not a reactive manner. As
Sage notes, reengineering "... must be top-down
directed if it is to achieve the significant and long-
lasting effects that are possible. Thus, there should
be a strong, purposeful and systems management ori-
entation to reengineering" (25).
Lowry and Duran (18), in assessing the adequacy of
the waterfall model, cite the lack of adequate support
for incremental development, such as many artificial
intelligence applications. The spiral model is much
more natural, especially as computer-aided software
engineering (CASE) tools shorten the production
cycle for the development of prototypes. In terms of
the spiral model (4), the amount of time needed to
complete one turn of the spiral has been shortened
for many of the turns through the use of CASE tools.
A potentially greater savings can be realized by
reducing the number of turns in the spiral as well as
through the development of knowledge-based tools.
Lowry believes that much of the process of develop-
ing software will be mechanized through the appli-
cation of artificial intelligence technology (17).
Ultimately, the specification-to-design-to-code
process will be replaced by domain-specific specifi-
cation aids that will generate code directly from
specifications. This interesting vision is based upon
much current reality, not only in the CASE arena, but
also in the area of domain-based reuse repositories
(11,16,19). In terms of the life cycle implications, the
waterfall will become shorter, and the spiral will
have fewer turns.
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Software Reuse in Wind Tunnel Control Systems
by Charles E. Niles
Software is an important element of wind tunnel
operations at NASA Langley Research Center
(LaRC). Reuse of wind tunnel automation software,
while limited, has produced benefits on a local scale.
Two forms of reuse have been utilized--from project
to project, and from system to system within a pro-
ject.
control system software to be moderately complex
and uniquely adapted and tuned for a facility.
Personnel safety and facility/model protection justi-
fies very reliable software which further adds to
complexity.
Automation System Projects
LaRC possesses a broad range of wind tunnels, test
facilities and laboratories which support our nation's
aeronautics and space endeavors. The wind tunnels
enable researchers to study aerodynamics, fluid
dynamics, acoustics, heat transfer and other similar
interests in order to evaluate and improve the perfor-
mance of aircraft, missiles, jet engines, spacecraft
and various components thereof.
Although wind tunnels vary in purpose, size, shape
and operating range, similar software has been used
across facilities for data collection systems, data
reduction systems and control systems.
To simplify discussions, only closed-circuit wind
tunnels will be addressed. Essentially, a wind tunnel
is a continuous, large-diameter cylinder arranged in
an elongated, oval circuit. Air or some other medium
is moved at speeds up to Mach 1.3 around the circuit
by large fan blades. Two-thirds of the distance
around the circuit from the fan blades is a test section
in which a model is manipulated at various pitch and
roll angles to gather data on aerodynamic effects.
The model may be fitted with scale-size jet engines
which are driven through independent high pressure
air systems. Pressures inside the tunnel range from
one to several atmospheres. Temperatures range
from near absolute zero to over 150 degrees
Fahrenheit.
Wind tunnel control systems actuate subsystems to
affect fan speed, pressure, temperature, pitch, roll
and other tunnel, model or test article processes. The
dynamic interaction among tunnel processes causes
Between early 1985 and late 1989, the 16-Foot
Transonic received a major overhaul in which almost
every operational system was affected. The staff
assembled for this effort encompassed every imagin-
able engineering discipline--civil, electrical, struc-
tural, mechanical, controls, and software, to name a
few.
During the overhaul, the control room was modern-
ized and state-of-the-art microcontroller equipment
was installed to provide automated controls for tun-
nel (TNL), model attitude (MDL), and high pressure
air (HPA) systems which were interconnected with a
standby (STB) system via a local ethernet network.
The STB system served as a ready standby for any
one of the other three microcontroller systems. The
STB shared its chassis with a gateway (COM) which
communicated with a process monitor and control
(PMC) minicomputer via a custom parallel link. The
PMC also communicated with the facility data
acquisition system via a separate network.
The effort involved the development of over 150,000
lines of code. The TNL, MDL, HPA, and STB micro-
controller code was written in PLM, FORTRAN, and
assembly language for Intel 8086 CPUs running the
RMX-86 operating system on the Multibus I archi-
tecture. The PMC code was written entirely in FOR-
TRAN-77 for a Modcomp running the MAX IV
operating system.
Approximately 75% of the PLM source code, known
as the environment code, is identical on the TNL,
MDL, and HPA systems. The FORTRAN code,
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whichrepresentsthecontrolalgorithms,is necessar-
ily unique. Overall, PLM (85%) and FORTRAN
(15%)makeup thebulk of the code.Assemblylan-
guage(lessthan 1%)wasusedonly whennecessary.
TheSTB systemis a compositeof theenvironment
codeandthespecificportionsof theTNL, MDL, and
HPAcode.
TheTNL, MDL, HPA, andSTB systemsconsistof
about30,000sourcelines each,while theCOM and
PMC combinefor about 30,000 lines. During the
project,the environmentcodewasdevelopedusing
the TNL systemas the basis.In effect, the MDL,
HPA,andSTBsystemswereinstancesof reusewith-
in the project.In addition,that portion of the COM
softwarewhich supportsthe local network among
the systemsis identical.The COM softwarewhich
supportstheparallellink andthePMChavenotbeen
reused.
A yearafterthe 16-Footproject,two control system
upgradeprojectswere performed.The first project,
at the Jet Exit TestFacility, involved cloning the
HPAsystem,makingsomefacility-specific changes,
and enhancingthe environmentcode.This was a
small project, requiring one softwaredeveloper.In
anextremelyunusualscenario,the computerhard-
ware arrived, the control system software was
installedand checkedout staticly. Severalmonths
later,therestof theprojectcaughtup while thesoft-
waredeveloperwasatgraduateschool.Theauthor,a
veteranof the 16-Footproject,waspressedinto ser-
viceto supportcheckoutof the integratedsystem.As
atestamento thestability of thesoftware,checkout
wentsmoothly.
ThesecondprojectattheNationalTransonicFacility
(NTF) was more complex. This project included
newer hardware (80486 Multibus II vs. 8086
MultibusI), a neweroperatingsystem(RMX-III vs
RMX-86), a newer language(PLM-386 vs PLM),
and integrationof the existing control algorithms.
Eachelementofferedadifferent challenge.Thefirst
threewerestraightforward--newhardwarerequired
newdrivers,anewoperatingsystemrequirednewor
modified system calls, and a new languagewas
almost transparent.But the existing control aigo-
rithmshadto be repackagedto conformto theenvi-
ronment-algorithminterface.
In thetransitionfrom 16-Footto NTF,somepartsof
the environment code were optimized. However,
addinggeneralizedcode which was formerly han-
dled uniquely by the microcontrollerscausedthe
overall size of the environment code to increase
slightly.At theendof theNTF project, 90% of the
original 16-Foot microcontrollersoftwarehadbeen
reusedwith little or nomodification.
In all, thesethreeprojectsaccountfor eight systems
which consist of the sameenvironmentcode with
incremental improvementsand optimization over
time.
issues
The obvious benefits of reusing the environment
code include shorter product delivery time, minimal
time invested in documentation after the initial facil-
ity, and easier maintenance. Beyond the obvious ben-
efits, the environment code has provided a firm foun-
dation to which new control algorithms have been
and are being added.
It is a pity that the code has not been reused more.
Unfortunately, the large initial investment in the 16-
Foot project took its toll. When the project was com-
pleted two years late, management took a dim view
of performing a software intensive project using in-
house personnel. Thus, only selected projects were
subsequently tackled. Of course, there were other
reasons--more projects than in-house staff could
perform, urgency in obligating funding (a form of
sheer madness), the emergence of commercial appli-
cations, and a rapidly changing hardware climate.
There have been several significant impediments to
reuse. Perhaps the biggest has been individuality.
Most of NASA's major accomplishments are attrib-
utable to individuals. NASA is full of free-thinking
scientists and engineers...and software developers
who are probably the most individualistic of all. Of
course, management traditionally has fostered an
environment of creativity and designer-preference.
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So,therehasbeenlittle disciplineto reuseanything,
muchlesssoftware,exceptonan individual basis.
Another impediment is organizational structure.
LaRClagsfar behindtheNASA spacecenterswhere
softwarehasbeena critical elementof mostevery-
thing ever launched.Although therearepocketsof
individual softwareexpertisescatteredacrossLaRC,
thereis no formal organization.Softwarereusewill
flourishmorein a softwareengineeringorganization
than not. In the author's engineeringorganization,
mechanical, structural, and civil disciplines are
prevalent.There are engineerswho develop soft-
ware,but no softwareengineers.Suchan environ-
ment is simply not conduciveto softwareengineer-
ing. Without software engineering,good software
designoccursby accident.Usually, inferior design
resultsin inferior sourcecodewhich shouldnot be
reused.
Next Generation
Three events since mid-1994 have changed the long-
term vision of automation projects within the
author's facility automation software development
staff. First, the staff underwent a capability self-
assessment which was facilitated by a cross-center
team of experienced software personnel and the
Navy's software engineering group at Damn Neck,
Virginia. The results brought management attention
to issues which affected the broader organization. In
short, the staff should focus more on facility automa-
tion and less on software development.
Second, the author, long an advocate of a standard
approach to automation systems at LaRC wind tun-
nels, accepted an offer for a team from the IV&V
Center in West Virginia to conduct a domain engi-
neering effort of wind tunnel control systems. The
team, known as the Software Optimization and
Reuse Team (SORT), methodically analyzed several
wind tunnel control systems and developed an essen-
tial set of requirements. More recently, SORT has
developed a set of derived requirements during a
domain design. The SORT effort also influenced the
third event.
Third, the author and a systems engineer who is also
a standard product advocate have embraced a new
approach with the full support of management who
want to reduce development costs and time in the
face of budget cuts and loss of personnel.
The rapidly changing hardware climate has also been
a factor. Since Intel decided to drop support for its
Multibus II architecture (along with the RMX-III
operating system), the need for a different hardware
platform became evident. The VXI bus architecture
has been chosen in order to accommodate the instru-
mentation needs of both control and data acquisition
systems. The Lynx Operating System (LynxOS) has
been chosen to replace RMX-III. Together, they rep-
resent the standard hardware/operating system plat-
form of the next generation.
The next generation also involves a widely used
software package known as EPICS (Experimental
Physics and Industrial Control System). EPICS,
which originated within the Department of Energy,
was developed by computer scientists and physicists
for application to electron beam accelerator facili-
ties. Over the years, EPICS has been adapted to other
applications including physics labs, astronomy labs,
and jet engine test facilities. Although EPICS is mak-
ing its first appearance at LaRC, it is already
installed at over 75 sites worldwide. Oddly enough,
EPICS is used by NASA at the Canberra tracking
station.
The author's organization believes EPICS will tran-
scend software reuse. Combined with a standard
hardware platform, EPICS means that systems can
be reused.
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by W. M. Lawbaugh
Healing the Wounds
by David M. Noer
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993
"Overcoming the Trauma of Layoffs and Revi-
talizing Downsized Organizations" is the subtitle of
this well-designed book. The author's purpose is
twofold: "to explain the nature of layoff survivor
sickness and to help both individuals and organiza-
tions formulate strategies to fight off this disease."
"Layoff survivor sickness" is Noer's term for the
widespread and toxic fear, anger and depression that
follow massive layoffs from downsizing, restructur-
ing, mergers and reengineering. He documents the
"survivor syndrome" from research on atomic bomb
survivors, Nazi concentration camp survivors and
even survivors in the space shuttle program after the
Challenger disaster. He finds "guilt, anxiety and
fear" as symptoms.
Healing the Wounds follows roughly the five stages
of grieving made popular by Dr. Elizabeth Kubler-
Ross: denial to anger to bargaining to guilt and
depression and finally to letting go and acceptance.
The pivotal chapter is nine when Noer urges: "break
the codependency chain and empower people." This
new-paradigm behavior was characterized a year
before Noer published this book, when Dagwood
Bumstead (the prototype of the old employment con-
tract employee) tells Mr. Dithers that he is quitting
the corporation to take a job in Blondie's entrepre-
neurial catering business. (Two weeks later, howev-
er, the comic strip shows Blondie firing Dagwood for
eating her profits and Dagwood returning sheepishly
to the J.C. Dithers Co.)
Nevertheless, Chapter 9 shows the folly of those who
measure their self-worth by their success in the code-
pendent organizational system. "Don't place your
spiritual currency in the organizational vault," Noer
pleads. Instead, he advises, let go of the codependent
relationship with the abusive organization, seek
detachment through good work (what Paul Hirsch
calls "free agent management" in Pack Your Own
Parachute, 1987) and try to "connect with a core
purpose," such as the spiritual awakening that comes
with completion of a Twelve-Step Program.
David Noer, vice president for training and education
the Center for Creative Leadership, says that life
after downsizing can be revitalizing for both the indi-
vidual and the organization if and when codependen-
cy yields to autonomy and self-empowerment. If not,
the organization is in decline.
To Build the Life You Want,
Create the Work You Love
by Marsha Sinetar
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995
Entrepreneur Marsha Sinetar attempts to bring such
corporate terms as reinventing and reengineering
down to a personal level. Her purpose is to provoke
readers into finding their own "right livelihood,"
work done in service to humanity with pure inten-
tions, according to Zen teaching. Or, in Jungian
terms, to discover their individual "vocation" or call-
ing to a higher level of life's work.
Alternating frequently between Eastern and Western
holistic definitions of work, Sinetar claims that "our
new job security requires healthy entrepreneurial
prowess." In other words, job security depends less
upon the employer and more upon the worker's own
self-reliance, creative resources and enthusiastic
engagement (what Rollo May calls "creative
encounter") with meaningful work.
To Build the Life You Want is based upon Abraham
Maslow's hierarchy of values, the apex of which is
"self-actualization," or, in her terms, "vocational
integration." Her ample quotations and anecdotes
come from a wide variety of sources, from Zen
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Mastersand Whoopi Goldberg to EdwarddeBono
andLouisLahr,formerCEO of 3M. Most of all, she
quotesherself,especiallyanearlierbook, Do What
You Love, The Money Will Follow.
Sinetar, who left a secure job as public school admin-
istrator to strike out on her own in business and writ-
ing, does have some interesting perspectives. For
example, in her final chapter she invites the reader to
view "work as art," with all its attendant risks, trials,
discipline and creativity.
"The most productive entrepreneurs I know gain
energy by managing it," she says in another chapter.
Instead of heavy lunches she recommends physical
workouts, yoga, massage, meditation, breathing
exercises or fruit juices for better health and vitality.
"Vitality also translates into widened opportunities:
People like to be around us when we're centered and
enthused."
Much of this book is based upon common sense, but
it is practical. Each chapter ends with "A Summary
Strategy" with thought-provoking questions and
exercises that could keep you busy for hours. Lively
anecdotes, crisp interviews and bountiful sugges-
tions for deeper reading add to the enjoyment of this
little (200 pages) book.
Being Digital
by Nicholas Negroponte
New York: Vintage Books, 1996
Nicholas Negroponte is founding director of the
Media Lab at M.I.T. and a frequent contributor to
Wired magazine, where portions of this book
appeared first.
The author distinguishes between being digital (all-
at-onceness, connected, now) and being analog (one
thing at a time, fragmented, left-brained). He is
decidedly pro-technology and insists that "many
electronic games teach kids strategies and demand
planning skills that they will use later in life."
Although Being Digital is available on tape
AudioBooks and on CD, both in abridged forms, it is
somewhat ironic it is published in "atoms," on paper,
not in cyberspace. The author admits he does not like
to read, owing mainly to his dyslexia.
Nevertheless, he has produced one of the clearest,
most interesting guides to the cyberworld he helped
to create. He explains bits, bytes and bandwidth, data
compression, high-definition TV, and some of the
myths and half-truths surrounding each. Yet, while
he discusses multimedia with competence, he admits
his only use of the Internet is for electronic mail, not
for research or data storage.
Perhaps the most interesting parts of Being Digital
are Negroponte's fearless predictions of the digital
future. He has already been proven correct in his
assessment of foiled attempts to regulate and censor
the Internet. Consider these prognostications:
"I am convinced that by the year 2000
Americans will spend more time on the
Internet... than watching television."
CD-ROMs are "the Beta of the 90s," bound
for extinction. "The fax machine.., is a step
backward."
"The value of information about information
can be greater than the value of information
itself." Witness TV Guide. Information in the
future will be customized and personalized to
interface well with the consumer.
• "Digital life will include very little real-time
broadcast" except for sports and elections.
• "In future media there will be more pay-per-
view," not less, unless you prefer advertising.
• "The notion of an instruction manual is obso-
lete.., nothing short of perverse."
"The middle ground between work and play
will be enlarged dramatically." Ditto for love
and duty.
"By the year 2020, the largest employer in the
developed world will be 'self.' Is this good?
You bet."
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Thereis adarksideto beingdigital, andNegroponte
glossesover privacy invasion,copyrightpiracy and
radical worker dislocation. Nevertheless,anyone
whose 80-year-oldmother sendshim email daily
cannotbelessthanoptimistic aboutthefuture.
The End of Work
by JeremyRifkin
New York: Putnam's,1995
"The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the
Dawn of the Post-MarketEra" is the subtitle of
JeremyRifkin's latestbook.His earlierbooks, The
Emerging Order and Time Wars, were well received
and successful. This one is ominous, especially in its
prediction of global unemployment.
"The Information Age has arrived," Rifkin
announces. "In the years ahead, new, more sophisti-
cated software technologies are going to bring civi-
lization even closer to a near-workerless world." In
the past, fading sectors of the economy always
seemed to give way to new, emerging sectors.
Agriculture gave way to manufacturing, which gives
way to the service sector. However, Rifkin notes, all
three sectors are experiencing "technological dis-
placement."
If there is a new economic sector emerging, it is the
"knowledge sector," made up of entrepreneurs, com-
puter programmers, educators and consultants. This
small but growing sector of "knowledge
workers'cannot begin to absorb more than a fraction
of the millions of workers displaced by machines.
Especially hard hit during re-engineering and down-
sizing were African Americans in office and clerical
jobs and laborers, as well as trade unionists, like
Machinists, Steelworkers and UAW members.
Some entire unions, such as typographical workers,
were wiped out in the recent postindustrial revolu-
tion.
Rifkin points out that this is not a national problem.
At times his rhetoric is harsh, scary. For example:
The death of the global labor force is being
internalized by millions of workers who expe-
rience their own individual deaths, daily, at the
hands of profit-driven employers and a disin-
terested government. They are the ones who
are waiting for pink slips, being forced to work
part-time at reduced pay, or being pushed onto
the welfare rolls. With each new indignity,
their confidence and self-esteem suffer anoth-
er blow. They become expendable, then irrele-
vant and finally invisible in the new high-tech
world of global commerce and trade.
The price of this "program," for Rifkin, is threefold:
a wider disparity between the super-rich and the
abject destitute, a slow death for the middle (work-
ing) class, and "a more dangerous world" due to teen
unemployment and terrorism.
Like most of his hard-hitting, penetrating and well
documented books on social policy, this book offers
solutions to turn the gloom and doom into sunshine
and happiness. His solutions are two. First, we must
reengineer the work week as we have the workplace.
Europeans are experimenting now with the shorter
work week (four days) or 30 hours per week.
Secondly, Rifkin proposes "a new social contract"
based upon "empowering the third sector." Our mar-
ket economies have stressed the government and
commerce sectors at the expense of what he calls the
social sector of education, health care, the arts, reli-
gion and community service. Various welfare reform
schemes involve workforce in such third sector jobs
as daycare and after-school programs.
Immediate implementation of both these solutions
may, however, be too little too late, according to
Rifkin. Some social scientists imagine a high-tech
world just around the corner wherein two percent of
the world's population can sustain the food, shelter
and clothing needs of all the rest. What the unem-
ployed do in such a world is still a mystery, but
Rifkin produces plenty of evidence that the end of
work as we know it may substantially diminish if not
disappear yet within our own lifetime.
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